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OPENING THE FLOODGATES OF SMALL
CUSTOMER CLAIMS IN FINRA
ARBITRATION: FINRA V. CHARLES
SCHWAB & CO., INC.
Teresa J. Verges*
"Currently, almost all customer agreements with brokerage
firms include an arbitration clause requiring customers to arbi-
trate their claims in an arbitration forum-and they're now pop-
ping-up in the investment advisory industry. By adding such
provisions, brokerage and advisory firms are essentially requir-
ing their clients to give up their legal rights before the client
even knows about the nature of a dispute, and before the client
has had the opportunity to consider whether giving up those
rights would be in their interest. The inclusion of such provi-
sions in brokerage and advisory contracts diminishes investor
protection."'
I. INTRODUCrION
When the Supreme Court held over twenty-five years ago that
customers could be compelled to arbitrate their federal securities
claims against their brokers,2 the vast majority of financial firms in
the U.S. inserted pre-dispute arbitration provisions ("PDAAs") in
agreements with their customers requiring them to arbitrate any
* Director, Investor Rights Clinic, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to the
University of Miami Law School, for supporting this article with a summer research stipend. I
am also grateful for the research assistance of Rachael K. Williams, UM Law JD/MBA Candi-
date, 2014, and Julianne Bisceglia, UM Law JD Candidate, 2014.
1 Luis A. Aguilar, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n ("SEC"), Outmanned and Outgun-
ned: Fighting on Behalf of Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections, Speech
before the North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA"): Annual
NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference (Apr. 16, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1365171515400#.UfmMIZWdzdk.
2 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). The Court held that
pre-dispute arbitration agreements were enforceable with respect to claims brought under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). Only two years later, in Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), the Court extended that reasoning to
claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"), 490 U.S. at 483-84, expressly
overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), long-standing Supreme Court precedent that had
largely shielded federal securities claims from mandatory arbitration.
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claims arising out of their brokerage relationship.' Since Sheerson/
Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, investor advocacy groups, scholars,
and legislators have called for Congressional action to eliminate
mandatory arbitration in securities cases,4 but the closest Congress
has come to such elimination has been to punt this issue to the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which has not yet
acted. Instead, building upon the development of a uniform securi-
3 See Barbara Black, Can Behavioral Economics Inform Our Understanding of Securities
Arbitration?, 12 TENN. J. Bus. L. 107 (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1647063; Jill I.
Gross, The End of Mandatory Securities Arbitration?, 30 PACE L. REV. 1174, 1180 (2010); SE-
CURITIEs ARBITRATION REFORM: REPORT OF THE ARBITRATION POLICY TASK FORCE TO THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS NAT'L Assoc. OF SECURITIES DEALERS, INC., 3 (1996), also known as
the "Ruder Report", available at http://www.lgesquire.com/NASDRuderReport.pdf.
4 Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.,
413, 419-20 (2006). Since 2007 there have been repeated efforts to amend the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, to preclude or invalidate mandatory arbitration agreements in con-
sumer and investor contracts, employment and civil rights claims. Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns
Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CINN. L. REV. 493, 498
(2008); see also George H. Friedman, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013: A Well-Intended but
Potentially Dangerous Overreaction to a Legitimate Concern, SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (June
2013), available at http://www.proffriedman.com/files/SAC AFAArticlefinal06-2013_.pdf.
The current Senate and House versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 ("AFA"), S. 987,
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s878, and H.R. 1844, available at http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hrl844, were proposed on May 7, 2013. The co-sponsors of
the bills in the Senate and House, Senator Al Franken (D-MN) and U.S. Representative Hank
Johnson (D-GA), expressly referenced AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) and other recent Supreme Court cases (including the then-anticipated adverse ruling in
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. _ , 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2013 WL 3064410
(2013)), that "erode[d] the rights of consumers" and allowed companies to "insulate themselves
from liability" through the use of mandatory predispute arbitration provisions that had the ef-
fect, under the Court's recent rulings, to bar consumers' participation in judicial class actions.
See Press Release, Rep. Johnson, announcing reintroduction of AFA, OFFICE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVE HANK JOHNSON (May 7, 2013), available at http://hankjohnson.house.gov/press-release/rep-
johnson-re-introduces-bill-protect-legal-rights-consumers; see also Press Release, Sen. Franken,
The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 (statement on the AFA), OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANKEN,
available at http://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/130507ArbitrationFairness.pdf (last
visited Feb. 10, 2014).
5 As part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010
("Dodd-Frank Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, Congress gave the SEC authority to
limit or prohibit arbitration provisions in agreements between customers and their broker deal-
ers or investment advisors. Section 921, 15 U.S.C. § 78o, amended Section 15 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), to provide the SEC with the authority to restrict or
prohibit mandatory pre-dispute arbitration with respect to claims arising under the federal secur-
ities law and rules of a self-regulatory organization: "The Commission, by rule, may prohibit, or
impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of
any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them
arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules of a
self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of conditions, or limita-
tions are in the public interest and for the protection of investors." Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 921(a), 124 Stat. 1841 (2010). It similarly amended Section 205 of the Investment
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ties arbitration code and other reforms that pre-dated McMahon,6
the SEC has prodded self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") to
make significant reforms to its arbitration rules that have improved
the arbitration process to make it fairer to investors.'
Today, nearly all customer disputes are resolved through arbi-
tration before the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA"),8 the largest arbitral forum for the resolution of securi-
ties disputes between member firms and their customers. 9 Under
the regulatory oversight of the SEC, FINRA has established a uni-
form, streamlined set of rules for the arbitration of customer dis-
putes designed to provide fairness, procedural protections, and
access to remedies customers would otherwise be able to obtain in
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5, to provide the SEC with the same authority with re-
spect to agreements between investors and their investment advisers. Id.
In addition, Dodd-Frank created a new federal agency to protect consumers' financial inter-
ests, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau ("CFPB"), and charged the agency with study-
ing the use of binding arbitration clauses in consumer financial services contracts. Dodd-Frank
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011, 124 Stat. 1964. Dodd-Frank also included an outright ban on
the use of arbitration clauses in mortgage contracts. Id. § 2149.
6 See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying discussion.
7 The SEC's regulatory oversight of SROs' rulemaking process, including review and ap-
proval of procedural rules governing arbitral forums, distinguish arbitration of securities disputes
from arbitration of consumer, employment and other commercial matters. Barbara Black & Jill
I. Gross, Investor Protection Meets the Federal Arbitration Act, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEx LIrIG. 1, 5
(2012). Since McMahon, there have been significant improvements to securities arbitration to
make the process fairer to investors, including providing prominent disclosure of PDAAs in
customer agreements that explain the process of arbitration and its consequences. Id. at 5-6;
Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why do Brokerage Firms Need Judi-
cial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415, 446-53 (2003) (discussing significant procedural re-
forms). See infra notes 35-44 and accompanying discussion.
8 FINRA is a private, not-for-profit corporation functioning as a self-regulatory organiza-
tion registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. FINRA was formed in July 2007
by the consolidation of National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the regulatory
arm of the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Alan Lawhead, Useful Limits to the Fifth
Amendment: Examining the Benefits That Flow From a Private Regulator's Ability to Demand
Answers to its Questions During an Investigation, 2009 COLUm. Bus. L. REv. 210, 212 (2009).
FINRA is responsible for regulatory oversight of broker-dealers in the U.S. Id. at 213-14; see
also Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("FINRA, as NASD's successor, is
'the only officially registered 'national securities association' under [the Exchange Act].'") (cita-
tion omitted). All broker dealers must be registered with FINRA. Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8); Fiero v. FINRA, 660 F.3d 569, 571 (2d Cir. 2011).
9 See Arbitration & Mediation, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediationlin-
dex.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2013); FINRA Dispute Resolution provides an arbitration forum
for customer disputes and industry disputes such as those between broker dealers and associated
persons, or between two or more broker dealers. Prior to the creation of FINRA, the vast
majority of securities disputes were filed before the NASD. Jill. I. Gross, Securities Mediation:
Dispute Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON Dis. RESOL. 329, 337 (2006)
(after McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas, most customer disputes were resolved in arbitration
in an SRO-sponsored forum, more than 90% before the NASD).
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court.' 0 Fundamental to the regulatory oversight of its dispute res-
olution system, efficiency, and fairness to customers, is the require-
ment that all FINRA members who choose to use PDAAs (a
nearly universal choice) are prohibited from limiting or abrogating
any of the procedural and substantive remedies otherwise available
to customers."
One of those remedies is the availability of a judicial forum for
customers to bring or participate in a class action. Since 1992, the
SROs have included provisions (now embodied in FINRA's Code
of Arbitration Procedures for Customer Disputes [the "Customer
Code"]), precluding representative actions in arbitration and fur-
ther providing that members may not compel arbitration of any
claim subject to a judicial class action unless that claim is removed
from the class action.' 2 In its adopting release, the SEC agreed
with the NASD that "class actions are better handled by the courts
and that investors should have access to the courts to resolve class
actions efficiently."' 3
Thus, the financial industry understood that it could not place
judicial class action waivers in their customer agreements without
running afoul of SRO conduct rules.14 However, in October 2011,
emboldened by the Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion,'s Charles Schwab & Co., Inc. ("Schwab") amended
nearly seven million customer agreements to include a waiver of
customers' rights to bring judicial class actions and, further, to pre-
clude consolidation of customer claims in arbitration.'6  In short,
Schwab's waiver provision required that customers bring their
claims, if any, in arbitration solely on an individual basis.
10 The SEC pushed SROs for a "litigation" model of arbitration, designed to provide proce-
dural protections. Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE L. REv. 1,
5-6 (2004) (procedural protections include providing reasonable notice to the customer that he
or she is entering into a PDAA, right to representation of counsel, to present evidence at a
hearing geographically convenient to the customer). See also infra notes 34-36 and accompany-
ing discussion.
11 FINRA Rule 2268(d). See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying discussion.
12 These prohibitions are now found in FINRA Rule 12204(a) and 12204(d); see also infra
notes 49-55 and accompanying discussion.
13 SEC approving release for amendments to NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure and
Rules of Fair Practice, Exchange Act Rel. No. 31371, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2767, 57 Fed. Reg. 42659
(Oct. 28, 1992).
14 Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 27-28; see also infra note 52.
15 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
16 Complaint and Request for Expedited Hearing 12-14, FINRA Office of Hearing Of-
ficers, Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No.
2011029760201 (Feb. 1, 2012), available at http://disciplinaryactions.finra.org/viewdocument.
aspx?DocNB=29288 [hereinafter Schwab Compl. & Request for Expedited Hearing).
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Predictably, FINRA's Department of Enforcement ("Enforce-
ment") filed an enforcement action claiming violations of its mem-
ber conduct rules prohibiting its members from inserting language
in their PDAAs that limit customers' rights under FINRA's forum
rules, including the ability to file judicial claims not otherwise pro-
hibited by FINRA, i.e., class actions.1 7 The Office of Hearing Of-
ficers ("the Panel") agreed with Enforcement that Schwab had, in
fact, violated the conduct rules as alleged, but refused to enforce
the rules prohibiting waiver of class actions reasoning that, under
the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Concepcion, the con-
duct rules were unenforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA")."
Aside from the Panel's stunning refusal to enforce FINRA's
Conduct Rules,'9 the Schwab OHO Decision is fundamentally
flawed because it all but ignores the member agreement between
FINRA and Schwab and, instead, focuses on the agreement be-
tween Schwab and its customers-which was not directly being
challenged. This is a significant, critical distinction between the
Schwab enforcement proceeding and cases where the judicial class
action waiver is directly being challenged by the customer or con-
sumer subject to the waiver, as presented by Concepcion and the
Supreme Court's most recent case on this issue, American Express
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.20 In contrast to those cases, the
customers subject to the PDAA in Schwab's agreement were not
challenging or resisting its enforcement. Instead, FINRA brought
17 Id. at T 20, 26 & 32 (setting forth three causes of action against Schwab; the first two
causes of action alleged violations stemming from Schwab's prohibition of judicial class actions,
and the third cause of action related to Schwab's prohibition against consolidation of claims in
arbitration).
18 Hearing Panel Decision Granting in Part and Denying in Part The Parties' Cross Motions
for Summary Disposition, FINRA Office of Hearing Officers, Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles
Schwab & Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201, 2013 WL 1463100 at *1 (Feb. 21,
2013). The FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, governs agreements to arbitrate involving "transactions in
commerce," 9 U.S.C. § 2. As Professors Black and Gross observe, the past four decades of
Supreme Court jurisprudence "has catapulted the FAA to super-status: it governs virtually
every arbitration clause arising out of a commercial transaction, applies in both state and federal
court, compels the arbitrability of federal statutory claims, permits arbitrators to rule on the
unconscionability of the arbitration clause, and preempts any state law that 'actually conflicts
with federal law-that is, to the extent that it 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' Black & Gross, supra note 7, at
11-12 (citations omitted).
19 FINRA is required to enforce compliance with its own rules and may be sanctioned by the
SEC for failure to do so. Exchange Act §19(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h); see also infra notes 106-112
and accompanying discussion.
20 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
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an action to enforce its own member agreement with Schwab
(which is itself an arbitration agreement), under which Schwab
agreed to certain restrictions in exchange for the benefit of mem-
bership. By elevating Schwab's customer agreement over its mem-
ber agreement with FINRA, the Panel's ruling is actually
inconsistent with the FAA and Supreme Court precedent requiring
strict enforcement of the parties' arbitration agreements. 2 1
The Schwab OHO Decision immediately reignited calls for a
ban on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in consumer
and investor contracts.2 2 The case is being closely watched by the
financial industry, and will likely end up before a Supreme Court
that is increasingly hostile to judicial class actions and has all but
closed the door on the effective vindication doctrine with its most
recent decision in Italian Colors.2 3 But the regulatory and contex-
tual differences between Schwab and the Supreme Court line of
cases provide hope that FINRA's conduct rules prohibiting class
action waivers will stand as enforceable and, therefore, remain in
the standard PDAA found in customer agreements with their
brokers.
Should the Schwab decision ultimately stand,24 however, the
consequences to smaller claim investors could be devastating given
the line of cases from Concepcion to Italian Colors. Many inves-
21 See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying discussion.
22 Several days after the decision was released, a group of thirty-seven U.S. Senators and
Congressmen led by Senator Al Franken (D-Minn.) sent a letter to the SEC urging it to act
under Section 921 of Dodd Frank Act to prevent mandatory arbitration provisions in broker-
customer contracts, stating:
We are deeply concerned that the Commission's failure to respond to the dan-
gers posed by widespread forced arbitration will weaken existing investor protec-
tions. Given the uncertainty created by the recent FINRA decision, we urge the
Commission to act quickly to exercise its authority under Section 921 to prevent this
practice and protect investor rights.
See Letter from Sen. Franken to the SEC, OFFICE OF SENATOR FRANKEN (Apr. 30, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=press-release&id=2381.
23 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309; see infra notes 127-145 and accompanying discussion.
24 Enforcement has appealed the Schwab OHO Decision to the National Adjudicatory
Council ("NAC"), which hears initial appeals from disciplinary actions. FINRA Code of Civil
Procedure, Rule 9310-11. Should the NAC reverse the Panel's decision, Schwab may appeal to
the SEC, id. Rule 9370, or the SEC may initiate review on its own. Exchange Act § 19(d)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2). Should the SEC issue a ruling adverse to Schwab, it can then file an appeal
of the decision in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the district in which it resides or does busi-
ness, or before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Exchange Act § 25(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78y, and thereafter, to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Black & Gross, supra note 7, at n. 53
(noting that Section 25(a) provides for plenary review of SEC disciplinary actions to "aggrieved
persons," which does not include FINRA acting in its adjudicative capacity) (citing NASD, Inc.
v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
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tors will be left with the choice of pursuing their claims pro se
through a complex arbitral system or abandoning them alto-
gether. 25 This unfortunate result will add pressure on the SEC to
exercise its authority under Dodd-Frank to limit or bar the use of
mandatory PDAAs which, as explained below, may be counter-
productive to the goal of fair and efficient resolution of investor
claims.2 6
Part II of this Article will provide a brief background of the
regulatory framework governing the brokerage industry and its use
of PDAAs in agreements with customers, and FINRA's limitations
on judicial class action waivers. Part III will set forth the facts set-
ting up the conflict between FINRA and Schwab and examine the
Schwab OHO Decision. The reasons why the Schwab OHO Deci-
sion is flawed and should ultimately be reversed are set forth in
Part IV of this Article. Finally, Part V will explore the conse-
quences to investors with small claims should judicial class action
waivers ultimately be held enforceable in securities cases, and al-
ternative proposals FINRA can explore to provide avenues for the
efficient resolution of investors' claims.
II. FINRA RULES PROVIDE FOR JUDICIAL CLASS ACTIONS
The Exchange Act "established a complex scheme to regulate
and maintain the capital markets as well as to protect the investing
public,"2 7 and created the SEC to administer and provide regula-
tory oversight.2 8 The Exchange Act requires all broker-dealers
that effect transactions in interstate commerce to register with the
25 Although FINRA has a simplified arbitration procedure for claims under $50,000, which
provides for resolution of claims solely on the parties' pleadings and without a hearing, FINRA
Rule 12800, as explained infra at notes 155-163 and accompanying discussion, this process has
important limitations and, for many investors, is still too complex to navigate without assistance.
26 See infra notes 150-154 and accompanying discussion.
27 Gross, supra note 9, at 345. Prior to the creation of the SEC, securities industry profes-
sionals were subject to standards of conduct set by SROs, which began as purely private mem-
bership organizations. Robert S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 151 (2008). The
NYSE was organized in 1792, and the NASD was formed in 1936, as a Delaware corporation,
after the reorganization of a trade group known as the Investment Bankers Association of
America. Id. at 159.
28 Exchange Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (creating the SEC), and see generally id. at
§§ 15, 19, 15 U.S.C. 78o, s.
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SEC,29 to become members of an SRO, 30 to abide by its rules and
be subject to the SRO's regulatory processes and enforcement ac-
tions."1 The 1975 Amendments to Section 19 of the Exchange Act
provided the SEC with direct authority over the SROs' rulemaking
processes, including authority to review, approve, modify or vacate
any rule, including rules governing their respective, arbitral
forums.3 2
As a result, by the time the Supreme Court considered McMa-
hon, the SEC filed an amicus brief in support of arbitration of se-
curities disputes, explaining that its newly granted authority under
Section 19 of the Exchange Act could ensure the fairness and ade-
quacy of SROs' arbitration procedures and enforce customers'
rights under the Exchange Act. Thereafter, the SEC and SROs
recognized the importance of making reforms to improve fairness
to investors, efficient resolution of disputes in arbitration, and to
29 Id. at § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3; Section 15(b) provides the SEC with broad authority to
limit, censure, suspend or bar broker-dealers and associated persons for violations of the federal
securities laws, rules and regulations. Id. § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. 78o-4.
30 Id. at § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8).
31 Id. at § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1); Lawhead, supra note 8, at 221-22.
32 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97; see Karmel, supra
note 27, at 162 (the 1975 Amendments greatly expanded the role of the SEC in providing regula-
tory oversight by, among other things, giving the SEC rulemaking oversight, expanding its role in
SRO enforcement and discipline, and providing for the SEC to "play an active role in structuring
the capital markets."). Indeed, in McMahon, the Supreme Court pointed to the 1975 Amend-
ments as one of the most significant changes since Wilko in the "regulatory structure of the
securities laws." Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987). Because
the Amendments provided the SEC with direct oversight to ensure that SROs implemented fair
and sound arbitration procedures for the resolution of securities disputes:
Since the 1975 amendments to § 19 of the Exchange Act ... the Commission has had
expansive power to ensure the adequacy of the arbitration procedures employed by
the SROs. No proposed rule change may take effect unless the SEC finds that the
proposed rule is consistent with the requirements of the Exchange Act; and the Com-
mission has the power, on its own initiative, to "abrogate, add to, and delete from"
any SRO rule if it finds such changes necessary or appropriate to further the objec-
tives of the Act. In short, the Commission has broad authority to oversee and to
regulate the rules adopted by the SROs relating to customer disputes, including the
power to mandate the adoption of any rules it deems necessary to ensure that arbitra-
tion procedures adequately protect statutory rights.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)(2), (c)) (emphasis added). "The 1975
Amendments to the 1934 Act added an indispensable layer of statutory regulation over SRO
arbitration . . . with the express statutory purpose of enhancing investor protection." Gross,
supra note 9, at 347.
33 Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, at 6-7, Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987) (No. 86-44), 1986 WL 727882.
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improve investor perception that arbitration is unfair.34  As de-
scribed by Professor Gross, in the first decade after McMahon, the
SEC approved numerous rule proposals designed to "level the
playing field and address criticisms of the process from investor
advocates," while the second decade focused on implementing vir-
tually every one of the over seventy reforms suggested in the 1996
Ruder Report.
FINRA has continued those efforts through its rules consoli-
dation process and additional reforms to improve the process and
sense of fairness to investors.3 6 During the last five years alone, the
SEC has approved new rules or amendments to existing rules of
the Customer Code designed to simplify and increase customers'
access to the FINRA arbitration process and enhance their percep-
tion of fairness of the arbitration process, including:
Amending the definition of "public arbitrator" to ensure
that individuals with ties to the securities industry may not
serve as public arbitrators, 3  and providing customers with
34 Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 18-19 (discussing extensive history of ongoing reform of
arbitration rules under SEC oversight, under NASD, FINRA's predecessor, and continuing
under FINRA).
35 Gross, supra note 4, at 496.
36 Following the consolidation of the NASD and NYSE Regulation, FINRA commenced a
process to develop a new "Consolidated Rulebook" of FINRA Rules that includes both NASD
and NYSE rules. Information Notice: Rulebook Consolidation Process, FINRA 1 (Mar. 12,
2008), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groupslindustry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/no-
tices/p038121.pdf. FINRA's consolidation process has involved streamlining and harmonizing
the NASD and NYSE rules, with a view towards ensuring that FINRA's rules reflect its "core
mission of investor protection and market integrity." Id. All new FINRA rules issued as a result
of the consolidation process have been reviewed and approved by the SEC after a comment
process. Information Notice: Rulebook Consolidation Process, FINRA 1 (Oct. 8, 2008), available
at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pl17155.pdf.
The first FINRA rules became effective Dec. 15, 2008. Regulatory Notice 08-57: Rulebook Con-
solidation Process, FINRA 1 (Oct. 2008), https://www.finra.org/web/groupslindustry/@ip/@reg/
@notice/documents/notices/pl17255.pdf.
37 Regulatory Notice 08-22, Definition of Public Arbitrator, SEC Approves Rule Change to
Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator in the Arbitration Codes for Customer and Industry
Disputes, FINRA 1 (May 2008), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groupsindustry/@ip/@reg/
@notice/documents/notices/p038472.pdf (announcing amendments to the definition of public ar-
bitrator in the Customer Code (Rules 12100(u)) and corresponding Industry Code (Rules
13100(u)) which added a revenue limitation of $50,000 to the definition of public arbitrator).
The amendments disqualify any attorney, accountant or other professional whose firm receives
more than $50,000 in annual revenue over the prior two years from services provided to the
financial industry or other persons already disqualified from serving as a public arbitrator. The
Regulatory Notice further instructed arbitrators to update their disclosures in light of the new
requirements, and that they were under an ongoing obligation to disclose. See also Regulatory
Notice 13-21, Public Arbitrator Definition, SEC Approves Amendments to Arbitration Codes to
Revise Definition of Public Arbitrator, FINRA 1 (June 2013), available at http://www.finra.org/
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the option of an "all public" arbitration panel;38
* Reducing the costs of FINRA arbitration on smaller claims
by increasing the monetary limits for simplified arbitration
proceedings, 39 single arbitrator panels,4 0 and greater flexibil-
ity as to hearing location;41
* Simplifying the discovery process through a presumptive au-
tomatic exchange of documents on customer and industry
lists of documents set forth in FINRA's Discovery Guide;42
web/groupslindustry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p272613.pdf (amending FINRA
Rules 12100(u) (Customer Code) and 13100(u) (Industry Code) to exclude persons associated
with a mutual fund or hedge fund from serving as a public arbitrator).
38 Regulatory Notice 11-05, Arbitration Panel Composition, Customer Option to Choose an
All Public Panel in All Cases, FINRA 1 (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.finra.org/web/
groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p122879.pdf (announcing new Rules
12402 and Rule 12043 (consolidating former FINRA rules on arbitrator panel composition and
selection) providing customers with the option of selecting an "all public" panel in cases requir-
ing three arbitrator panels (claims over $100,000)). The Regulatory Notice explained that "pro-
viding customers with the right to exclude a non-public arbitrator from the panel deciding their
case will enhance customers' perception of the fairness of FINRA's rules and the securities arbi-
tration process." Id. Initial studies conducted indicate that the all public panels have been
favorable to customers, increasing their recovery rate approximately 40%. Howard B. Prossnitz,
Who Wins FINRA Cases and Why, 19 PIABA BAR J. 141, 151-52 (2012) (reviewed cases re-
solved in 2011 and noted that all public panels increased the win rate for customers from 45.6%
to 63%; FINRA's own review of cases produced consistent results, a win rate increase from 44%
to 62%).
39 Regulatory Notice 12-30, Simplified Arbitration, SEC Approves Amendments to Arbitra-
tion Codes to Raise the Limit for Simplified Arbitration from $25,000 to $50,000, FINRA 1 (June
2012), available at http://www.finra.org/webgroups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/no-
tices/pl27156.pdf (amending FINRA Rule 12800 (Customer Code)). FINRA's simplified arbi-
tration procedures for small claims provide for a cost-effective, streamlined dispute resolution
process through which a single arbitrator resolves the dispute between the parties and issues and
award based solely on the written submissions of the parties. The customer still has the option of
requesting a hearing in a simplified proceeding.
40 Regulatory Notice 09-13, Threshold for Single Arbitrator Cases, SEC Approves Amend-
ments Raising the Threshold for Single Arbitrator Cases $100,000, FINRA 1 (Feb. 2009), availa-
ble at ,http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/p118034.
pdf (amending FINRA Rule 12401 (Customer Code) and Rule 13401 (Industry Code) to raise
the amount in controversy for appointing a single chair-qualified arbitrator from $50,000 to
$100,000). FINRA explained that the amendments would "streamline the dispute resolution
process and decrease costs for users of the forum." Id. at 2.
41 Regulatory Notice 10-17, Hearing Locations, Amendments to the Arbitration Rules on
Hearing Locations, FINRA 1 (April 2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/indus-
try/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pl21222.pdf (amending FINRA Rule 12213 (Customer
Code) to provide customer with option to request hearing location closest to his or her
residence).
42 Regulatory Notice 11-17, Arbitration, Revised Discovery Guide and Document Production
Lists for Customer Arbitration Proceedings, FINRA 1 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.finra.
org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/notices/pl23505.pdf. In 1999 the NASD
established a "Discovery Guide," for use in arbitrations, which includes Document Production
Lists setting forth categories of documents that the parties are to automatically exchange within
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* Significantly limiting the grounds upon which motions to dis-
miss may be granted prior to a hearing, thereby assuring that
most customer claims be reviewed on the merits;43 and
* Requiring arbitration panels to provide "reasoned awards"
upon the parties' request.44
A fundamental component of the regulatory scheme gov-
erning securities arbitration is that member firms are prohibited
from altering procedural rules or substantive claims and remedies
through its PDAA. As early as 1989, the NASD and other SROs
adopted rules to prevent members from inserting any provisions in
PDAAs that would limit or contradict any rules of the SRO in an
effort to address issues of "fairness and efficiency in the arbitration
process." 4 5 As the SEC explained in its adopting release:
sixty days after the answer is due, and are, therefore, presumptively discoverable. Id. The 2011
revisions to the Discovery Guide expanded FINRA's guidance on discovery and simplified the
process by combining fourteen lists (two general and twelve that were based on specific types of
claims) into two lists of "presumptively discoverable" documents-one for firms/associated per-
sons, and the other for customers. Id.
43 Regulatory Notice 09-07, SEC Approves New Motion to Dismiss Rule and Amendment to
the Eligibility Rule in Arbitration; FINRA Imposes Immediate 30-Day Moratorium on Motions to
Dismiss, FINRA 1 (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/
@notice/documents/notices/p117757.pdf (adopting new FINRA Rules 12504 (Customer Code)
and 13504 (Industry Code), governing motions to dismiss in arbitration, and amending existing
12206 (Customer Code) and 13206 (Industry Code), which set forth jurisdictional eligibility re-
quirements for arbitration). Among the goals of the new rules and amendments was to "ensure
that parties have their claims heard in arbitration by significantly limiting motions to dismiss
filed prior to the conclusion of a party's case-in-chief and by imposing strict sanctions against
parties for engaging in abusive practices under the rules." Id. at 2. The new rules limited the
grounds for dismissal of a claim prior to a hearing on the merits to three grounds: 1) the non-
moving party previously released the claim in a signed settlement agreement or written release;
2) the moving party was not associated with the account(s), securities or conduct at issue; or 3)
the claim does not meet the criteria of the eligibility rule. Id. at 4. FINRA proposed the new
rules and amendments in response to concerns that respondents were routinely filing motions to
dismiss, thereby making arbitration far more costly and time-consuming, and that the practice
was increasing. Id. at 3-4.
44 Regulatory Notice 09-16, Explained Arbitration Decisions, SEC Approves Amendments to
Require Arbitrators to Provide an Explained Decision at Parties' Joint Request, FINRA 1 (Mar.
2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/no-
tices/p118141.pdf (amending FINRA Rules 12214, 12514 and 12904 (Customer Code) and
13214, 13514 and 13904 (Industry Code), requiring arbitrators to provide an explained decision if
requested by both parties at least twenty days before the first scheduled hearing date). FINRA
stated in the notice that the lack of explanations in awards "has been a common complaint of
non-prevailing parties . . . especially customers and associated persons." Id. at 2.
45 In 1989 the arbitration rules of SROs were amended to prohibit "any language" in a
PDAA that limits or contradicts the arbitration rules of any SRO. See Order Approving Pro-
posed Rule Changes by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. and the American Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to the Arbitration Process and
the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, SEC Rel. No. 34-26805, 54 Fed. Reg. 21144, 1989
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[T]he proposed rules appropriately balance the need to
strengthen investor confidence in the arbitration systems at the
SROs, both by improving the procedures for administering the
arbitrations and by creating clear obligations regarding use by
SRO members of predispute arbitration clauses, with the need
to maintain arbitration as a form of dispute resolution that pro-
vides for equitable and efficient administration of justice.4 6
This prohibition is embodied today in FINRA Rule 2268
(taken from former NASD Rule 3110), which sets forth the re-
quirements to its members when using PDAAs for customer ac-
counts. Among other things, the rule sets forth requirements
concerning specific cautionary language and disclosures that must
be included in customer agreements that contain a PDAA and, fur-
ther, provides instruction on where and how the disclosures should
be placed in the agreement.4 7 Importantly, subsection (d) of the
rule prohibits members from inserting any provision in their
PDAA that "limits or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory
organization." 48 And although the rule does not expressly address
judicial class actions, it prohibits members from including in their
PDAAs "any condition that ... limits the ability of a party to file
SEC LEXIS 843, at *1 (May 10, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Approving Release]. NASD members
were informed in an August 1989 Notice To Members ("NTM") that the amendments included
an express prohibition on the use of language that would "limit" or "contradict" an SRO's arbi-
tration rules. NTM 89-58, 1989 NASD LEXIS 107, at *2-3 (Aug. 1989). The SEC observed that
this provision benefitted investors, explaining that:
"Agreements cannot be used to curtail any rights that a party may otherwise have
had in a judicial forum. If punitive damages or attorneys' fees would be available
under applicable law, then the agreement cannot limit parties' rights to request them,
nor arbitrators' rights to award them. The agreements may not be used to shorten
applicable statutes of limitation, restrict the situs of an arbitration hearing contrary to
SRO rules, nor to limit SRO forums otherwise available to parties." 1989 Approving
Release, 1989 SEC LEXIS at *61.
46 Id. at *63-64.
47 FINRA Rule 2268(a) requires that any PDAA be highlighted and preceded by language
expressly set out in the rule that alerts customers to the fact that the agreement contains and
PDAA and the consequences of entering into an arbitration agreement, including, that: (1) the
customer is giving up their right to sue in court, and right to trial by jury; (2) arbitration is
binding and that there are limited grounds for reversal or modification of an award; (3) discov-
ery is more limited in arbitration; (4) arbitrators do not have to explain their awards unless all
parties to the arbitration request a reasoned award; (5) the panel may include a minority of
members affiliated with the industry; (6) arbitration forum may impose time limitations for
bringing a claim; and (7) the rules of the arbitration forum are incorporated into the PDAA.
FINRA Rule 2268(a), available at http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/display-main.html?
rbid=2403&element id=9955.
48 Id. at 2268(d)(1).
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any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules of
the forums in which a claim may be filed under the agreement." 49
A class or representative action is the type of action "permit-
ted to be filed in court" under the rules of FINRA, because
FINRA Rule 12204 proscribes class actions in arbitration.5 0  Rule
12204 also prohibits the arbitration of claims being litigated against
the same defendants in a judicial class action, or the enforcement
of an arbitration agreement against a customer who is a member of
a judicial class action, unless the customer files a notice with
FINRA establishing that he or she is not participating in the class
action."' The industry has generally understood that when Rule
12204(d) is read together with FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3) (and their
predecessor NASD rules), judicial class actions are permitted and
any provision that would limit or waive the customer's ability to
bring or participate in a class action is invalid.5 2
Indeed, the SEC and SROs have recognized since the early
1990s that arbitral forums were ill-equipped to handle collective
claims and, based on rule changes proposed by the Securities In-
dustry Committee on Arbitration ("SICA") for the Uniform Code
of Arbitration, the SEC agreed that investors should have the abil-
ity to seek redress of small claims in judicial class actions." As the
49 Id. at 2268(d)(3).
50 FINRA Rule 12204(a), available at http://finra.complinet.comlen/display/display.html?
rbid=2403&recordid=5189&elementid=4110&highlight=elects#r5189.
51 Id. at 12204(b)-(c). Subsection (b) prohibits arbitration of claims that are "based upon
the same facts and law" and involve the same defendants, as in a judicial class action, unless the
customer files with FINRA a copy of the customer's opt-out notice filed with Court or otherwise
a notice that the customer will not participate in the judicial class action or any recovery there-
from. Subsection (d) bars enforcement of an arbitration agreement against a customer who is
also a member of a certified or putative class "with respect to any claim that is the subject of the
certified or putative class action until:
* The class certification is denied;
* The class is decertified;
* The member of the certified or putative class is excluded from the class by the court; or
* The member of the certified or putative class elects not to participate in the class or
withdraws from the class according to conditions set by the court, if any." Id. 12204(d).
52 Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No.
2011029760201, 2013 WL 1463100 at * 11 ("For two decades, the industry has understood [Rules
2268(d)(3) and 12204(d), and their NASD predecessor rules] to operate together to preserve
customers' ability to bring or participate in judicial class actions.").
53 SEC Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions
From Arbitration Proceedings, approving amendments to the NASD Code of Arbitration Proce-
dure and Rules of Fair Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-31371, 1992 SEC LEXIS 2767, 57
Fed. Reg. 42659 (Oct. 28, 1992) [hereinafter SEC Order Relating to the Exclusion of Class Ac-
tions from Arbitration Proceedings] (approving NASD rule amendments to rules that form the
precursor of FINRA Rules 12204(a) and 12204(d)). But see Bradley J. Bondi, Facilitating Eco-
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SEC explained in approving the proposed amendments to preserve
judicial class actions:
Over the years of the evolution of class action litigation, the
courts have developed the procedures and expertise for manag-
ing class actions. Duplication of the often complex procedural
safeguards necessary for these hybrid lawsuits is unnecessary.
The Commission believes that investor access to the courts
should be preserved for class actions and that the rule change
approved herein provides a sound procedure for the manage-
ment of class actions arising out of securities industry disputes
between NASD members and their customers.54
The SEC tacitly recognized that class actions serve an important
role in investor protection, and the new amendments reflected "an
efficient allocation of resources between two dispute resolution
systems."55
III. SCHWAB CHALLENGES FINRA CONDUCT RULES
PROHIBITING CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
A. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion
The Concepcion56 case squarely placed at issue the enforce-
ability of a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement when, as
alleged by plaintiffs, the size of the individual claims would be far
outweighed by the costs of individual litigation. Customers that
had entered into a service contract with AT&T brought a class ac-
nomic Recovery and Sustainable Growth Through Reform of the Securities Class-Action System:
Exploring Arbitration as an Alternative to Litigation, 33 HARV. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 607, 624
(2010) (arguing that the SEC did not base its approval of proposed rule out of a concern over the
integrity of the arbitration process, but rather, based on a recognition that the federal judicial
system already had developed procedures to manage class actions, and developing similar proce-
dures in arbitration would be duplicative and wasteful).
54 SEC Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions
From Arbitration Proceedings, supra note 53, at *9-10.
55 Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 28. In contrast to representative or class actions, since
1984 SRO rules have provided for consolidation of claims. See Notice to Members 84-51,
Amendments to Code of Arbitration Procedure, 1984 NASD Lexis 330, at *9 (Sept. 28, 1984),
now embodied in FINRA 12312, which vests the Director and arbitration panel with the author-
ity to separate or consolidate claims against in a single arbitration proceeding under certain
circumstances, see infra notes 71, 86-90 and accompanying discussion. As the Schwab Panel
stated in its decision, consolidation of claims under FINRA Rule 12312 is triggered when a
matter is otherwise subject to arbitration, and is not a representative type of procedure, distin-
guished from class actions. Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *8.
56 AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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tion alleging fraud and false advertising in connection to the car-
rier's "free cell phone" promotion. AT&T moved to compel
arbitration, pointing to the mandatory arbitration agreement in its
cell phone service contract with its customers that prohibited class
actions." The District Court denied AT&T's motion based on Cal-
ifornia's Discover Bank rule,59 holding that the mandatory arbitra-
tion provision was unconscionable because AT&T had failed to
demonstrate that the provision "adequately substituted for the de-
terrent effects of class actions."6 0 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, also
finding the provision unconscionable and, further, holding that the
Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the FAA because it was
"'a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to con-
tracts generally in California.'" 6 1
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the FAA preempted state law that operated to invalidate a contrac-
tual arbitration provision. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
started with the Court's now standard reiteration of the origins and
purpose of the FAA, specifically that it was enacted in 1925 in re-
sponse to "widespread judicial hostility" to arbitration agree-
ments,6 2 and that the FAA reflects "both a 'liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration' . . . and 'the fundamental principle that arbi-
57 Id. at 1744. AT&T Mobility had advertised free telephones when a customer entered into
a new service contract. Id. The Concepcions entered into the cell phone service contract with
AT&T and received cell phones, but had to pay $30.22 in sales taxes based on the retail value of
the phones. Id. Plaintiffs filed an action in U.S. District Court, which was later consolidated
with a putative class action. Id. at 1744-45.
58 Id.
59 In Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), the California Supreme
Court held that class action waivers in arbitration agreements may be held unconscionable and,
therefore, unenforceable, under certain circumstances. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (citing
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110). Specifically, when the waiver is found in a "consumer contract
of adhesion," where the disputes involve "predictably small amounts of damages," and the party
with the "superior bargaining power" has engaged in wrongful conduct that serves to "cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small amounts of money," and enforcement of
the provision would "exempt" the party from responsibility, presumably because it would be too
costly to bring individual claims, the Discover Bank rule allows California courts to invalidate
and refuse to enforce such provisions. Id. (quoting Discover Bank).
60 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS
(AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, *14 (S.D. Cal., Aug. 11, 2008)). Although the District Court found
that the arbitration provision in AT&T's cell phone service contract unconscionable on this
ground, it did describe the provision favorably, noting that it provided customers with a "'quick,
easy to use"' dispute resolution process and a minimum recovery provision for the customer. Id.
61 Id. (quoting Laster v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009)).
62 Id. at 1745 (citing Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008)).
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tration is a matter of contract."' 6 3 Observing that the Discover
Bank rule had been routinely applied by California courts to invali-
date arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts, it held that the
rule "'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress"' and was, there-
fore, preempted by the FAA.64
Concepcion is widely regarded as having dealt a near fatal
blow to judicial class actions brought on behalf of consumers, civil
rights plaintiffs and others.6 5 In the first year after Concepcion,
forty-five class actions were dismissed by federal courts on the
grounds that the claims were subject to a mandatory arbitration
provisions.6 6 In the context of securities claims, however, custom-
ers' abilities to bring or participate in class actions had not been
impacted by Concepcion because its members did not challenge
63 Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
and Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)).
64 Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
65 See generally Miriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 623, 627 (2012) (Concepcion all but
forecloses aggregate litigation for consumers, civil rights plaintiffs, and others because compa-
nies can essentially insulate themselves with waiver provisions that will be upheld.); Jill I. Gross,
AT& T Mobility and the Future of Small Claims Arbitration, 42 Sw. U. L. REV. 47, 49 (2012) ("By
inserting a class action waiver clause in their consumer contracts, companies can prevent con-
sumers from aggregating small claims, forcing them to pursue small claims individually. . . . The
funneling of low dollar value claims into simplified arbitration has serious implications for con-
sumers and most investors of modest means seeking substantive and procedural justice in a fo-
rum in which their claim is heard solely on the papers. Substantively, pro se parties may not
have the education, training, or ability to effectively communicate their complex arguments in
writing.") (citations omitted); Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration
Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L. REV. 457,
462-63 (2011) ("[T]he most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of recent Su-
preme Court decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers with low value claims."); Jean
R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV.
703, 704 (2012) ("It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name 'conception'
should come to signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs. . . . By permitting
companies to use arbitration clauses to exempt themselves from class actions, Concepcion will
provide companies with free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination and other harmful acts
without fear of being sued.") (emphasis added).
66 Robert M. Buchanan, Jr., The U.S. Supreme Court's Landmark Decision in AT&T Mobil-
ity v. Concepcion: One Year Later, BLOOMBERG LAW (2012), available at http://about.bloomber-
glaw.com/practitioner-contributions/att-v-concepcion-one-year-later/. The author identified
seventy-six cases from the date Concepcion was issued in April 2011, through March 2012, where
federal courts reviewed an arbitration provision in a putative class action, and found: 1) in forty-
five cases the courts enforced the arbitration provisions and dismissed the cases; 2) in fourteen
cases the courts rejected the arbitration provision and maintained the class action; 3) in four
cases the plaintiffs brought their class actions in arbitration, and 4) in thirteen cases the federal
courts had not decided the issue but rather, either sent the issue to arbitration for resolution by
the arbitration panel, or ordered further discovery or set an evidentiary hearing. Id.
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FINRA's conduct rules prohibiting class action waivers. Until
Schwab decided to take on the challenge.
B. Emboldened By Concepcion, Schwab Amends Nearly
Seven Million Customer Agreements to Include a Class Action
Waiver Provision and Non-Consolidation Agreement
In October 2011, on the heels of the Concepcion decision,
Schwab amended its Customer Account Agreement to include a
provision titled, "Waiver of Class Action or Representative Ac-
tion" ("Waiver"). 6 7 The new provision was contained in a forty-
page document Schwab mailed to its 6.8 million customers titled
"Important account information you need to know," containing a
series of amendments to the customers' account agreements with
Schwab. 68 The Waiver stated in relevant part:
Neither you nor Schwab shall be entitled to arbitrate any claims
as a class action or representative action, and the arbitrator(s)
shall have no authority to consolidate one or more than one par-
ties' [sic] claims or to proceed on a representative or class action
basis. You and Schwab agree that any actions between us and/
or Related Third Parties shall be brought solely in our individual
capacities. You and Schwab hereby waive any right to bring a
class action, or any type of representative action against each
other or any Related Third Parties in court. You and Schwab
waive any right to participate as a class member, or in any other
capacity, in any class action or representative action brought by
any other person, entity or agency against Schwab or you.
The Waiver foreclosed both judicial class actions and the consolida-
tion of claims in FINRA arbitration, requiring that any customer
claim be arbitrated solely on an individual basis.
67 Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No.
2011029760201, 2013 WL 1463100 at *10. Schwab had also recently settled two class actions
alleging, among other things, that Schwab misled investors about the risks associated with its
proprietary Yield Plus Funds, in violation of federal and state securities laws. In re Charles
Schwab Sec. Litig., No. C08-01510 WHA, 2011 WL 1481424 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2011) (order
approving class action settlements totaling $235,000,000). The Schwab Yield Plus class action
litigation demonstrates the importance of a collective action procedure for small claims: the
average estimated settlement payment was $881, id. at *17-18, an amount too small to make
arbitration on an individual basis feasible. See also Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 7.
68 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *9-10, n.41. The forty-page notice to customers contained
five amendments to their customer account agreement, including the Waiver at issue, which was
one of five amendments. Id. at *10 n.41.
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On February 1, 2012, FINRA Enforcement brought an action
for sanctions against Schwab, alleging that the Waiver provision vi-
olated FINRA Rule 2268(d)(1) and NASD Rule 3110(f)(4)(A),
which prohibit member firms from including "any condition" in
PDAAs that "limits or contradicts the rules of any self-regulatory
organization," and FINRA Rule 2268(d)(3) and NASD Rule
3110(f)(4)(C), which expressly prohibit member firms from includ-
ing "any condition" in PDAAs that "limits the ability of a party to
file any claim in court permitted to be filed in court under the rules
of the forums in which a claim may be filed under the agree-
ment."6 9 Enforcement argued that the prohibition against judicial
class actions expressly "limits" and "contradicts" a customer's
rights under FINRA Rule 12204(d) of the Customer Code. 70 En-
forcement further alleged that the Waiver's non-consolidation lan-
guage that "the arbitrator(s) shall have no authority to consolidate
one or more than one parties' [sic] claims" violated FINRA Rule
12312 of the Customer Code." Finally, by virtue of these rule vio-
lations, Enforcement alleged that Schwab violated FINRA Rule
2010, Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of Trade.72
Importantly, Enforcement argued that the FAA was irrelevant
because the only issue before the Panel was whether the Waiver
violated FINRA's member conduct rules and, if so, sanctions
should be imposed.7 3 However, Schwab argued that even if it vio-
69 Although FINRA's procedural rules were applicable at the time the enforcement action
was filed, the applicable conduct rules that were alleged to have been violated are those that
existed at the time the conduct occurred. Id. at *2 n.i. NASD Rules 3110(f)(4)(C) and (f)(4)(A)
were effective until December 4, 2011, and thus applicable when Schwab introduced its Waiver.
FINRA Rules 2268(d)(3) and 2268(d)(1), which contain the same language as NASD Rules
3110(f)(4)(C) and (f)(4)(A), respectively, became effective on December 5, 2011.
70 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *3-4. FINRA Rule 12204, Class Action Claims, was in ef-
fect throughout the relevant period. Id.
71 Id. at *4. FINRA Rule 12312 was in effect throughout the relevant period. Id. Rule
12312(a) allows one or more parties in an arbitration proceeding to submit multiple claims
jointly if they contain "common questions of law or fact" and either "assert any right to relief
jointly and severally," or the "claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences." FINRA Rule 12312(a). Subsection (b) of the rule grants the Di-
rector of Arbitration the power to separate claims filed jointly, or initiate consolidation of
claims, prior to the appointment of the panel of arbitrators. Once the panel is appointed, how-
ever, Rule 12312 provides final authority on consolidation to the arbitrators. FINRA Rule
12312(b).
Enforcement argued that Schwab's imposition of an agreement to limit the power of the
arbitrators to consolidate multiple claims was an impermissible "limit" or "contradiction" of
Rule 12312, in violation of FINRA Rule 2268(d)(1) and NASD Rule 3110(f)(4)(A). Schwab
OHO Decision, supra note 18, at *5.
72 Schwab Complaint & Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 16, at 20, 26, 32.
7 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *5.
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lated FINRA's conduct rules, the FAA applied and prevented the
enforcement of those Rules. Schwab successfully persuaded the
Panel that the FAA applied and, under the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Concepcion, FINRA's rules preventing waiver of judicial
class actions were unenforceable."
C. The FINRA Hearing Panel Refuses to Enforce its Member
Conduct Rules Prohibiting Class Action Waivers
Reviewing both the plain terms and purpose of the relevant
conduct rules, the Panel easily reached the conclusion that Schwab
violated rules as alleged, observing that since 1989, the NASD and
other SROs have prohibited its members from limiting or contra-
dicting its arbitration rules in order to ensure that "investor dis-
putes with broker-dealers are handled in a consistent fashion,
according to the rules that have been reviewed and approved by
the [SEC] as contributing to investor protection and the public in-
terest." 7 6 The Panel further found that Rule 12204 was "intended
and designed to preserve judicial class actions as an option" and,
when read together with FINRA Rules 2268(d)(1) and (d)(3),
these rules operate to preserve a customer's right to pursue a judi-
cial class action and prohibit a member from otherwise limiting
that right.
74 Id. On the same day that FINRA filed its enforcement proceeding, Schwab filed an action
in District Court for the Northern District of California seeking a declaratory judgment and
preliminary injunction prohibiting FINRA from proceeding with the enforcement action.
Charles Schwab & Co. v. FINRA, 861 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2012). On May 12, 2012 the
magistrate judge dismissed Schwab's action on the grounds that it failed to exhaust its adminis-
trative remedies. Id. at 1069.
75 See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying discussion. The Hearing Panel held a non-evi-
dentiary hearing on May 30, 2012 and, thereafter, on Aug. 28, 2012, issued an Order informing
the parties that the panel had determined to dismiss the first two Causes of Action (based on the
waiver of the judicial class action), but to find a violation as to the third Cause of Action (based
on the prohibition against consolidation of claims in arbitration). The Hearing Panel ordered
briefs on sanctions. Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *3.
76 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *10-11.
77 Id. at *11-12. "[F]or two decades, the industry has understood these Rules to operate
together to preserve customer's ability to bring or participate in judicial class actions." Id. (cit-
ing Notice To Members ("NTM") 92-65, 1992 NASD LEXIS 23 (Dec. 1992)). NASD's Notice
to Members informed its members that they could not use a PDAA to limit a customer's right to
participate in a class action. Id. at *12. The Panel also pointed to the absence of class action
waivers in PDAAs until Schwab inserted its provision post-Concepcion as further evidence of
the industry's understanding that such waivers are prohibited by SRO rules. Id.
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Finding that Schwab clearly violated FINRA's conduct rules,
the Panel should have ended its inquiry and sanctioned Schwab.7 8
Instead, shifting its focus with little explanation from Schwab's
conduct and its obligations under its membership agreement with
FINRA, to Schwab's agreement with its customers, the Panel set
out to determine whether the FAA applied to the Waiver provi-
sion. 79 By focusing entirely on Schwab's agreement with its cus-
tomers, the Panel judged the enforceability of that agreement
under the FAA (which it held applied to Schwab's agreement)80
and a long line of Supreme Court cases interpreting the FAA as
establishing a "national policy of arbitration."81
According to the Panel, Concepcion and subsequent Supreme
Court cases required enforcement of the Schwab Waiver provision
unless there was a clear "contrary congressional command," rea-
soning that "countervailing policy concerns that might counsel
against arbitration of a particular kind of dispute-whether state or
federal, statutory or regulatory-cannot override the FAA's man-
date, unless there is a clear expression of congressional intent to
carve out an exception to the FAA."82  The Panel acknowledged,
78 Indeed, the only relevant agreement before the Panel was the member agreement be-
tween FINRA and Schwab, not the customer agreement. See infra notes 95-105 and accompa-
nying discussion. Moreover, the Panel does not have authority to refuse to enforce FINRA
rules. See infra notes 106-112 and accompanying discussion.
'9 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *16 .
80 Id. The Panel reasoned that Section 2 of the FAA applies to "every written agreement to
arbitrate" in a contract "'evidencing a transaction involving commerce,"' such as that in
Schwab's customer agreement, and Schwab's customer agreement expressly incorporates the
FAA. Id. The Panel also observed that FINRA has not objected to the inclusion and applica-
tion of the FAA in its members' agreements with customers. Id.
81 Id. at *17 (quoting AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747 (2011)).
The Panel explained that in Concepcion, the Supreme Court rejected the judicially created pub-
lic policy doctrine under Discover Bank that provided exceptions to enforcement of class action
waivers where application would be unconscionable because of the size of the claim, and made
plain that no state policy could supersede the FAA's arbitration mandate. Id. at *17.
82 Id. (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)). The
Panel discussed four subsequent Supreme Court cases since Concepcion that, it reasoned, fur-
ther supported that notion that claims subject to an arbitration agreement must be arbitrated
under the FAA unless there is a clear congressional command to the contrary. Id. at *17-18.
Three of the decisions involved state law: Nitro-Lift Technologies, LLC. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct.
500, 503 (2012) (per curiam) (vacated an Oklahoma court decision holding non-compete agree-
ments unenforceable under Oklahoma law on the grounds that the agreement contained
mandatory arbitration provision); Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203
(2012) (arbitration provision in nursing home contract must be enforced despite West Virginia's
public policy holding such agreements unenforceable); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25
(2011) (per curiam) (vacated and remanded Florida state court decision refusing to compel arbi-
tration of two claims because other claims were not subject to arbitration and the result would
be proceedings in two forums); Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (Jan. 10,
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and quickly dismissed, the SEC's general oversight of FINRA's au-
thority to promulgate rules as insufficient to establish a contrary
congressional command to create an exception to the FAA. 3
Looking no further and noting that Enforcement had failed to
identify anything in the securities laws showing a "congressional
intent to preserve judicial class actions as an option" in customer
claims, 84 the Panel concluded that Schwab's Waiver must be en-
forced "to require customers to go to arbitration and that any
FINRA policy determination that judicial class actions should re-
main available to customers must give way to the FAA's
mandate.""
The Panel reached the opposite conclusion with respect to
Schwab's Waiver provision under which customers agreed that "the
arbitrator(s) shall have no authority to consolidate one or more
than one parties' [sic] claims."8 6 The Panel agreed that Schwab's
Waiver provision prohibiting consolidation of claims did violate
FINRA rules because it deprives arbitrators of authority expressly
granted under FINRA Rule 12312 under the Customer Code.8 7 It
2012) (involved a federal statutory claim under the Credit Repair Organizations Act
("CROA")). In Compucredit, the Court vacated and reversed a Ninth Circuit order refusing to
compel arbitration of CROA claims brought by consumers in a class action against credit card
marketer and banks. Compucredit, 132 S. Ct. at 669. The Panel pointed to Compucredit in sup-
port of its conclusion that the analysis under the FAA is the same whether the countervailing
policy is state, federal or regulatory. Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *18-19.
83 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *18-19. Although the Panel acknowledged that FINRA
promulgates rules pursuant to delegated authority from the SEC and that its rules are subject to
oversight and approval, and may preempt state law, it reasoned that those rules can only be
enforced to the extent they are consistent with federal law-which includes the FAA. Id.
This conclusion wholly ignores the highly structured and regulated system created by the
Exchange Act and subsequent amendments, with the primary goals of promoting market effi-
ciency and integrity, and investor protection. Under Section 15A of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3, Congress gave "front-line authority for regulating" the brokerage industry to
SROs, under direct oversight of the SEC. Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 17. As Professors
Black and Gross explain, "FINRA's raison d'etre is to carry out the statutory purposes and to
enforce compliance by its members and associated persons with the provisions of the Exchange
Act and its regulations as well as FINRA's own rules." Id. at 17-18. The SEC's direct oversight
of FINRA's rulemaking process, including rules governing its dispute resolution forum, provide
a compelling evidence of a Congressional intent to preserve the ability FINRA to bar class ac-
tion waiver provisions in the PDAAs of its members.
84 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100 at *19.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at *19-20. The Panel observed that "NASD arbitrators first were granted express
authority to consolidate or join claims in 1984, and NYSE arbitrators gained such express au-
thority in 1990. Although the precise language of the Rules has changed over time, it has been
plain for decades that arbitrators have the power to make all final determinations with respect to
joining and consolidating the claims of multiple parties." Id. at *13.
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found that the FAA was not implicated, however, because consoli-
dation is a "procedural issue" that is triggered once the matter has
been submitted to arbitration in the first place.88  "Once it is clear
that a particular dispute falls within the scope of an arbitration
agreement, procedural questions regarding how the arbitration
should proceed are determined by the arbitrators."8  The Panel
concluded that Schwab's non-consolidation provision in the Waiver
provision violated FINRA's Rules and sanctioned Schwab with a
fine of $500,000.90
IV. WHY FINRA PROHIBITIONS ON JUDICIAL CLASS ACTION
WAIVERS Do NOT VIOLATE THE FAA
Only several months after the Schwab OHO decision, the Su-
preme Court reinforced its jurisprudential approach of elevating
the FAA to super contract status, while further closing the door to
88 Id. at *20. The Panel also noted the difference between consolidation of claims and class
actions:
[Clonsolidation-in contrast to class action procedure-is consistent with the
goals of the FAA, because consolidation concerns considerations of efficiency and
streamlined resolution of similar issues. Consolidation-unlike class action proce-
dure-does not involve complex issues of notice and fairness to absent parties ...
The ability of the forum to consolidate when appropriate and to clarify in a consis-
tent way the applicable law contributes to FINRA's ability to perform its regulatory
mission and protect investors." Id. (quotation and citations omitted).
89 Id. at *17 (citing Dockser v. Schwartzberg, 433 F.3d 421, 426-27 (4th Cir. 2006)). The
Panel reasoned that the FAA does not specify what powers an arbitrator should have or the
particular procedures that must be followed in arbitration, nor does the FAA prohibit FINRA
from authorizing an arbitrator the right to consolidate multiple claims or from barring members
from altering procedures in arbitration. Id. at *17-18. Ironically, the Panel pointed to the
"highly regulated nature of the securities industry" and, specifically, to the 1975 amendments to
the Exchange Act to support the notion of a structured and consistent approach to arbitration
procedures that should be uniformly applied to members: "To permit FINRA members like
Schwab to write themselves out of FINRA's Rules would undercut the basis for the decision in
[Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon] that arbitration does not deprive customers of substantive
protections under the securities laws." Id. at *20 (citing Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 233-34 (1987)). This analysis undermines the Panel's reasoning with respect to
Schwab's judicial class action waiver provision.
90 Schwab, 2013 WL 1463100. at *21-22. FINRA Enforcement has appealed the Panel's
decision to the NAC. On May 15, 2013, Schwab announced that it was modifying its customer
account agreement to eliminate the class action waiver provision for any disputes relating to
events occurring after that date and for the foreseeable future. Press Release, Schwab Statement
on Class Action Waivers, CHARLES SCHWAB (May 15, 2013), available at http://www.about-
schwab.com/press/issues/statement. Schwab stated that while it believed that the arbitral forum
was best suited to resolve disputes, it would "voluntarily remove the waiver going forward until
the issue is resolved by the appropriate regulatory andlor court decisions." Id.
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class actions of small claims otherwise subject to arbitration. First,
in Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter,91 the Court upheld an arbitrator's
construction of the parties' agreement as providing for class arbi-
tration.9 2 Second, and only ten days after Oxford Health Plans was
decided, the Court issued Italian Colors,93 a decision that essen-
tially eliminates the "effective vindication" exception to enforce-
ment of judicial class action waivers in most PDAAs.9 4 However,
fundamental differences between arbitration of customer securities
disputes and arbitration of consumer or employment disputes re-
quire the NAC to reverse the Panel decision. Moreover, the Ex-
change Act and recent amendments under Dodd-Frank provide
"clear congressional intent" to preserve judicial class actions in se-
curities claims against brokerage firms.
A. The Relevant Agreement Before the Hearing Panel was the
Member Agreement between FINRA and Schwab and
Enforcement of that Agreement is Consistent
with the FAA
The Panel's conclusion that it could not enforce FINRA's con-
duct rules proscribing Schwab's judicial class action waiver under
the FAA is fundamentally flawed because, among other things, it
focused its analysis on the wrong agreement. Specifically, the
Panel focused on Schwab's judicial waiver provision in its customer
agreement and whether that provision was enforceable under the
FAA and Concepcion.95 However, in contrast to Concepcion and
the other Supreme Court cases cited by the Panel in reaching its
conclusion, one of the parties to that agreement-the customer-
was not present. Indeed, procedurally the Schwab case was distin-
guishable from every Supreme Court case cited by the Panel be-
cause no customer had actually challenged the enforceability of
Schwab's judicial waiver provision.96
91 133 S. Ct. 2064 (June 10, 2013).
92 Id. at 2070-71. The Court found that the parties' agreement provided that the arbitrator
could decide whether the PDAA in the plaintiff physician's contract with Oxford allowed for
class arbitrations. Id. at 2070.
93 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
94 See infra notes 131-144 and accompanying discussion.
95 Id. at 15 (discussing Schwab's customer agreement and its express incorporation of the
FAA in that agreement).
96 In Concepcion, the arbitration agreement between AT&T and its customers was directly
at issue because it was the grounds upon which AT&T moved to dismiss the class action filed by
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Instead, the relevant agreement before the Panel was the one
that exists between FINRA and its member, Schwab. FINRA
brought an enforcement proceeding because Schwab had violated
its conduct rules, which are incorporated into the member agree-
ment between FINRA and Schwab.9 7 Indeed, the membership
agreement between FINRA and its members is itself an agreement
to arbitrate (and enforceable according to its terms) because,
among other things, it compels its members to consent to arbitra-
tion upon the demand of its customers, even without a separate
PDAA in the agreement between the member and the customer.9 8
By entering into its membership agreement with FINRA, Schwab
agreed to abide by the arbitration rules of that forum, including the
rules proscribing judicial class action waivers. Ignoring the mem-
bership agreement in the context of considering Schwab's waiver
provision is contrary to well established Supreme Court precedent
its customers. AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Similarly, all of the
post-Concepcion decisions cited by the Panel involved disputes between parties to the agree-
ment containing the pre-dispute arbitration provisions challenged therein: Nitro-Lift Technolo-
gies, LLC. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 503 (2012) (employees resisted arbitration under a non-
compete agreement with its former employer); Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct.
1201 (2012) (family members of nursing home relatives who executed contracts with nursing
homes that contained PDAAs); KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23 (2011) (auditor moved to
compel arbitration in suit brought by nineteen individuals and entities who purchased limited
partnerships); Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (consumers subject to
mandatory arbitration under PDAA contained in credit card application opposed motion to
compel arbitration filed credit card marketer and banks in class action).
97 FINRA membership constitutes an agreement to "'adhere to FINRA's rules and regula-
tions, including its Code and relevant arbitration provisions contained therein."' In re Am. Ex-
press Fin. Advisors Sec. Litig., 672 F.3d 113, 128 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting UBS Fin. Servs. v. West
Va. Univ. Hosp., Inc., 660 F.d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 2011)). See also Kidder, Peabody & Co. v.
Zinsmeyer Trusts P'shp, 41 F.3d 861, 863 (2d Cir. 1994) ("The rules of a securities exchange are
contractual in nature."); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Pyles, 701 F. Supp. 217, 220 (N.D. Ga.
1988) ("Securities exchange members are contractually bound by the regulations of their organi-
zations, including any arbitration provisions."). Schwab has been a member of FINRA (and
NASD before it) since 1970; in its membership application with FINRA (then NASD) and sub-
sequent amendments to that application, Schwab agreed to abide by FINRA's rules. Schwab
Complaint & Request for Expedited Hearing, supra note 16, at IT 10, 11.
98 FINRA Rule 12200 of the Customer Code provides that "[p]arties must arbitrate a dis-
pute under the Code if ... [arbitration] . . . is [r]equested by the customer. . ." and the dispute is
between a customer and member or associated person of a member and the dispute arises out of
the business activities of the member. The Panel expressly recognized this in its decision, noting
that FINRA's arbitration rules "themselves constitute an agreement to arbitrate that is covered
by the FAA, even separate from a customer-member agreement." FINRA Office of Hearing
Officers, Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No.
2011029760201, 2013 WL 1463100 at *15 (citing Washington Square Sec., Inc. v. Aune, 385 F.3d
432, 435 (4th Cir. 2004) and Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Silverman, No. 12-1208, 2013 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2412, *3-4 (4th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013)).
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establishing that arbitration agreements are fundamentally a mat-
ter of contract. 99
Indeed, in Stolt-Nielsen, the Court stressed that arbitration "is
a matter of consent, not coercion,"i and the primary purpose of
the FAA is "to ensure that 'private agreements to arbitrate are en-
forced according to their terms."'01 Of particular relevance here
is the Court's recognition that parties to an arbitration agreement
may structure their contract as they choose, and enforcement of
such limitations is perfectly consistent with the FAA:
Underscoring the consensual nature of private dispute resolu-
tion, we have held that parties are 'generally free to structure
their arbitration agreements as they see fit.' For example, we
99 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (citing Rent A Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct.
2772, 2776 (2010)). The Supreme Court has held that a party may contractually modify or limit
its ability to arbitrate by entering into other agreements, and enforcement of these agreements is
entirely consistent with the FAA, even if the result is to place the particular claim or dispute
outside of arbitration. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. Of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989), where the Supreme Court held that the parties' agreement, which
contained both a PDAA and a choice-of-law provision, would be enforced according to its terms
even if applying the choice-of-law provision required a stay arbitration. Id. at 479. The Supreme
Court explained that:
[W]e have recognized that the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they
have not agreed to do so. ... It simply requires courts to enforce privately negotiated
agreements to arbitrate, like other contracts, in accordance with their terms." Id. at
478-79.
Most recently, in Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, WL 2459522, at *1
(June 10, 2013), the Court again stressed the fundamental principle under the FAA of providing
for arbitration in accordance with the parties' agreement. Sutter, a physician who provided med-
ical services to Oxford Health Plans' insureds under a fee-for-service contract that contained an
arbitration agreement filed a class action in New Jersey Superior Court alleging that Oxford had
failed to fully pay him and other similarly situated physicians. Id. at *3. Oxford successfully
moved to compel arbitration and the parties agreed that the arbitrator should decide whether
the parties' PDAA authorized class arbitration. Id. at *3-4. The arbitrator decided that the
PDAA authorized a class arbitration and, thereafter, Oxford filed a motion in federal district
court to vacate the decision claiming that the arbitrator had exceeded his powers under
§10(a)(4) of the FAA. Id. at *4. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed. Id.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Kagan stressed that the only relevant question under
§10(a)(4) is whether the parties' contract provided the arbitrator with the power to decide the
particular question at issue, not "whether he got its meaning right or wrong." Id. at *45. The
Court distinguished Stolt-Nielsen, where the arbitrator lacked any contractual basis for ordering
class procedures, from the case at bar where the parties agreed to give the arbitrator the power
to interpret the broad arbitration provision in Oxford's contract. Id. at * 6. Notwithstanding
the Concepcion majority's reservations about the use of class procedures in arbitration, Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51, the Court upheld the arbitrator's construction of the agreement to
provide for class arbitration, concluding that "[t]he arbitrator's construction holds, however
good, bad or ugly." Id.
100 Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 at 1773 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at
479).
101 Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478).
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have held that parties may agree to limit the issues they choose
to arbitrate, and may agree on rules under which any arbitration
will proceed. . . . They may choose who will resolve specific dis-
putes. . . . We think it is also clear from our precedents and the
contractual nature of arbitration that parties may specify with
whom they choose to arbitrate their disputes. 102
Through its membership agreement with FINRA, which is en-
tirely voluntary, Schwab agreed to limit by contract its ability to
arbitrate and abide by the arbitration procedures mandated by
FINRA. Schwab agreed to abide by FINRA requirements con-
cerning the use of PDAAs, including FINRA Rule 2268, which
prohibits placing limitations on these agreements.1 0 3  In return,
Schwab is reaping the benefits of its membership agreement with
FINRA by conducting a securities business in the U.S. It would be
inimical to the principles of contract and the FAA to not enforce
all of these provisions, including the limitation on the content of
Schwab's arbitration provisions with its customers. 104
102 Id. at 1774 (quotations and citations omitted).
103 As noted by Professors Black and Gross, courts have voided securities firms' arbitration
provisions that run afoul of SRO rules. Black & Gross, supra note 7, at n.154 (citations omitted).
104 The Panel's analysis was also flawed to the extent that it equated FINRA's rules to federal
regulation: "While [FINRA] Rules have the force and effect of federal regulation and may pre-
empt state law, FINRA's Rules can only be enforced to the extent that they are not inconsistent
with federal law." FINRA Office of Hearing Officers, Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab
& Co., Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201, 2013 WL 1463100 at *18 (citing Credit
Suisse First Boston v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1128-32 (9th Cir. 2005); Clark v. Wells Fargo
Invs., LLC, No. 10-4916 SC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79975, at *5-7 (N.D. Cal July 22, 2011);
Heilimann v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. CV 10-8623-GW(JCx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68155, at *4
(C.D. Cal., June 6, 2011); Bloemendaal v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, EDCV 10-1455
DSF (PLAx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61772, at *22-23 (C.D. Cal., May 23, 2011)). These cases,
however, cannot be stretched to the conclusion urged by the Panel. Grunwald involved a con-
flict between new California state rules and NASD rules governing arbitrator disclosures; the
Ninth Circuit held that state rules that conflict with SRO rules are preempted under the Ex-
change Act if they prevent the SRO from complying with its rules (which have been approved by
the SEC) or if it "interferes with the Congressional goals underlying the Exchange Act." Grun-
wald, 400 F.3d at 1132. The remaining cases involved challenges to brokerage firms' employee
account and trading policies, promulgated under NYSE Rule 407, among other SRO rules. Re-
lying on Grunwald, among other cases, and discussing generally the system created by the Ex-
change Act of self-regulation by SROs under SEC oversight, the district courts held that the
SRO rules preempted various actions under state law. Clark, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79975 at
*5-7 (NYSE Rule 407 preempts action under Section 450 of the California Labor Code);
Heilimann, 2011 U.S. Dist LEXIS 68155, *6-7 (same); Bloemendaal, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61772, at *24-26 (same).
As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Grunwald, even though the SEC has direct oversight of
FINRA and its rulemaking process, FINRA is a private organization. Grunwald, 400 F.3d at
1128 (SROs are "private entities"); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. UMB Fin. Servs., 618 F.3d 906,
909 (8th Cir. 2010) ("FINRA is a private entity"); Waddell & Reed Fin. Inc. v. Torchmark Corp.,
223 F.R.D. 566, 623 (D. Kan. 2004) ("NASD is a private, not-for-profit corporation"); Desiderio
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Moreover, failing to enforce the member agreement inappro-
priately elevates one contract over another. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly stressed that the purpose of the FAA is to place
arbitration agreements on "'the same footing as other con-
tracts," 05 not to elevate arbitration agreements above other con-
tracts. By focusing on the Schwab agreement with its customer
(which was not directly at issue in any event), the Panel effectively
elevated that agreement above the agreement that exists between
FINRA and Schwab.
B. The Hearing Panel Did Not Have the Authority to Refuse to
Enforce FINRA's Conduct Rules
Another fundamental problem with the Schwab OHO deci-
sion is that it ignores FINRA's statutory obligation to enforce its
own rules under Section 19(h) of the Exchange Act, which states in
pertinent part:
Suspension or revocation of self-regulatory organization's regis-
tration; censure; other sanction
The appropriate regulatory agency for a self-regulatory organi-
zation is authorized . . . to suspend for a period not exceeding
twelve months or revoke the registration of such self-regulatory
organization, or to censure or impose limitations upon the activ-
ities, functions, and operations of such self-regulatory organiza-
tion, if such appropriate regulatory agency finds . . . that such
self-regulatory organization has violated or is unable to comply
with any provision of . . . its own rules or without reasonable
v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198, 206 (2d Cir. 1999) ("NASD is a private actor, not a state actor."); United
States v. Shvarts, 90 F. Supp. 2d 219, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is beyond cavil that the NASD is
not a government agency; it is a private, not-for-profit corporation.").
105 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985) (citing H. R. REP. No. 96,
68th Cong. (1924)). See also AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011)
("In line with these principles, courts must place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts, and enforce them according to their terms."). Notwithstanding this principle re-
iterated by the Court in a long line of cases through Concepcion, Supreme Court jurisprudence
in the last thirty years has actually thwarted that purpose, establishing, instead, a judicial policy
favoring arbitration. See Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 91, 94 (2012); see also Ronald G. Aronovsky, The
Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a Preemptive Federal Arbitration Proce-
dural Paradigm?, 42 Sw. L. REV. 131, 134 (2012) (Court's expansive "'pro-arbitration policy'
may be leading toward a preemptive federal arbitration procedural paradigm"); Gross, supra
note 4, at 495 (observing that the Supreme Court's decisions since McMahon "have imbued the
FAA with super status").
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justification or excuse has failed to enforce compliance ... by a
member.106
Section 19(h) provides the SEC with authority to sanction any
SRO that has failed to comply with any provision or rule of the
Exchange Act, or has "failed to enforce" compliance of the SRO's
own rules.107 The SEC has instituted administrative proceedings
against the NASD and other SROs when they have failed to en-
force rules under the Exchange Act or their own rules. 0 s
The Panel simply did not have the authority to refuse to en-
force FINRA's conduct rules. To the contrary, to the extent the
Panel's refusal to enforce the relevant conduct rules amounts to a
modification of those rules, it is impermissible under Section 19(b)
of the Exchange Act, which requires that all rule changes, addi-
tions or deletions be filed with the SEC and subject to the approval
process set forth in Section 19(b)(2).109 Section 19(b)(1) makes
plain that "[n]o proposed rule change shall take effect unless ap-
proved by the Commission or otherwise permitted in accordance
with the provisions of this subsection.""o "By declaring FINRA's
conduct rules 'non-enforceable,' the Panel has de facto deleted the
106 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006).
107 Id. at § 78s(h)(1). See also Lawhead, supra note 8, at 222 ("FINRA must enforce compli-
ance by its members with the Exchange Act, including Exchange Act rules, and FINRA's
rules.").
108 See, e.g., In re Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Rel. No. 37538, 62 SEC
Docket 1346 (Aug. 8, 1996) ("The Exchange Act requires the NASD, as a self-regulatory organi-
zation, to comply with, and vigorously enforce, in an evenhanded and impartial manner, the
provisions of the Exchange Act, the rules and regulations thereunder and its own rules, in carry-
ing out its role as the entity responsible for the day-to-day oversight of its members and the
Nasdaq market."); see also Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding The Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc. ("Nasdaq"), as Overseen By Its
Parent, The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD"), Exchange Act Rel. No.
51163 (Feb. 9, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-51163.htm (Find-
ing that the NASD failed to provide sufficient oversight of Nasdaq in connection with market
surveillance responsibilities delegated to it, and stressing that "the NASD, an SRO, retains over-
all responsibility for enforcing the federal securities laws and its own rules" even when certain
functions have been delegated to another "facility" such as the Nasdaq).
109 15 U.S.C. §78s(b).
110 Id. at §78s(b)(1). The SEC's role in the rule-making process is critical to its regulatory
oversight of SROs and Exchanges. Through a thorough review and comment process, the SEC
ensures that proposed rules, and any changes or deletions to existing rules, promote fairness and
efficiency in the markets and protect investors. "With only minor exceptions, no proposed rule
change takes effect unless it is approved by the SEC, upon a finding that it is 'consistent' with the
requirements of the Exchange Act and the applicable regulations." Black & Gross, supra note 7,
at 18. FINRA Rules undergo at least two comment processes. First, FINRA issues a Regulatory
Notice announcing proposed rules and inviting interested parties to submit comments, see
FINRA Rule Making Process, Industry Professionals FINRA, FINRA, available at http://www.
finra.org/Industry/Regulation/FINRARules/RulemakingProcess/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2014);
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rules or, at the very least, modified them so that they carry no pun-
ishment," neither of which FINRA can do without complying with
the statutory notice and comment process."1 '
While the NAC could reverse the Hearing Panel's decision on
this ground alone, it leaves open the fundamental question asked
by the Panel in the first place: whether there is a clear Congres-
sional intent to create an exception from the FAA for judicial class
actions in securities disputes." 2 As discussed below, the Sections
29(a) and 15(o) of the Exchange Act provide compelling evidence
of a "clear congressional intent" to vest the SEC and FINRA with
authority to prohibit judicial class action waivers in PDAAs be-
tween brokers and their customers.
C. Congress Has Indicated its Intent to Preserve Judicial Class
Actions for Small Claim Investors
To the extent the Hearing Panel required explicit language in
the federal securities laws establishing a "congressional intent to
preserve judicial class actions as an option" in customer claims," 3 it
should have found such language in two significant amendments to
the Exchange Act under Dodd-Frank. Specifically, an amendment
to Section 29(a),1 4 which governs waivers under the Exchange
Act, and Section 15(0)," 5 which provides the SEC with authority
to ban the use of PDAAs. Remarkably, the Panel did not mention
either provision.
FINRA then submits its proposed rules to the SEC pursuant to the approval and comment
process set forth in §19(b)(2). Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §78s(b)(2).
111 Brief for the NASAA as Amicus Curiae, at 6, In re Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles
Schwab & Co., FINRA Disciplinary Proc. No. 2011029760201, before the National Adjudicatory
Counsel (Mar. 8, 2013) (on file with author).
112 FINRA Office of Hearing Officers, Dep't of Enforcement v. Charles Schwab & Co., Dis-
ciplinary Proceeding No. 2011029760201, 2013 WL 1463100 at *6, *18.
113 Id. at *19.
114 15 U.S.C. § 78cc.
115 15 U.S.C. § 780(o) (amending section 15 of the Exchange Act to read, "The Commission,
by rule, may prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on the use of, agreements that require
customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future
dispute between them arising under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations there-
under, or the rules of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of
conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of investors.").
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1. Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act
Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits "any condition,
stipulation, or provision" that would bind any person to "waive
compliance" with any provision of the Exchange Act or the rules
promulgated thereunder.1 6  The Supreme Court has interpreted
this provision to be "concerned with whether [an] agreement
'weaken[s] [customers'] ability to recover under the [Exchange]
Act."t 17  To the extent that a class action waiver significantly af-
fects or "weakens" a customer's ability to bring an action, it argua-
bly runs afoul of Section 29(a), even before it was amended by
Dodd-Frank."'
The Dodd-Frank amendment to Section 29(a), however, ex-
pressly added the reference to rules promulgated by "a self-regula-
tory organization."119 Section 29(a), as amended by Dodd-Frank,
now states:
Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any
rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory
organization, shall be void.1 2 0
By expressly incorporating into Section 29(a) "any" SRO rules,
which, in turn, have contained long-standing prohibitions against
class action waivers in PDAAs, Congress explicitly rejected
PDAAs that failed to comply with FINRA rules. 12 1
116 15 U.S.C. § 78cc.
117 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) (quoting Wilko v.
Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 432 (1953)). The Court concluded that Section 29(a), which voids agree-
ments that waive "compliance" with the Exchange Act, prohibits waiver of the "substantive
obligations imposed by the [Act]." Id. The Court reasoned that since Section 27 of the Ex-
change Act providing jurisdiction for violation of the Exchange Act in the district courts did not
confer any substantive rights, an arbitration provision waiving the right to a judicial forum was
not void under Section 29(a). Id.; see also Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 44.
118 Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 20-21. McMahon stands for the principle that section
29(a) "forbids agreements that weaken investors' protections under federal securities (or
equivalent) laws." Id. at 21.
119 Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929T, 124 Stat. 1376, 1867 (2010).
120 15 U.S.C. 78cc(a) (emphasis added).
121 15 U.S.C. 78cc(a). See also Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 19 (As a result of Dodd-
Frank's amendment "[flor the first time, § 29(a) explicitly invalidates provisions in brokerage
agreements that require customers to waive compliance with FINRA rules."). Indeed, because
the Schwab waiver provision effectively requires its customers to "waive compliance" with
FINRA rules 2268(d) and 12204, it is rendered void under Section 29(a).
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2. Section 15(o) of the Exchange Act
Dodd-Frank amended the Exchange Act to give the SEC ex-
plicit authority to prohibit the use of, or impose conditions on"
[A]greements that require customers or clients . . . to arbitrate
any future dispute between them arising under the Federal se-
curities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules
of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition,
imposition of conditions, or limitations are in the public interest
and for the protection of investors.'22
The statute is solely an enabling statute, as it does not require the
SEC to act. However, Section 15(o) provides the SEC with broad
authority to prohibit or impose conditions upon the industry's use
of PDAAs.12 3
Although the SEC has not yet taken any action to prohibit or
limit the use of PDAAs in customer agreements, it does not need
to act for purposes of the analysis at bar. The statutory authority
granted by Congress alone provides evidence of a "clear congres-
sional intent" to vest the SEC with authority to limit the use of
PDAAs. For example, Dodd-Frank vested the newly created Con-
sumer Financial Protection Bureau with authority to prohibit or
limit the use of PDAAs in consumer financial products or ser-
vices.12 4 In Compucredit,12 5 the Supreme Court pointed to this spe-
cific authority as an example of the "clarity" by which Congress
expresses its intent to restrict the use of arbitration provisions.12 6
122 15 U.S.C. § 780(o).
123 Dodd-Frank's provisions are largely the result of recommendations in the Treasury De-
partment's 2009 white paper on financial reform. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REG-
ULATION (2009) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT], available at http://treasury.gov/initiatives/
Documents/FinalReport-web.pdf; Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection Af-
ter the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. LAW 101,
110 (2011). The Treasury Department expressed concern that the use of mandatory arbitration
provisions would undermine investors' interests by eliminating access to courts. TREASURY RE-
PORT, supra note 123, at 72.
124 Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 § 1028, 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (2012). The statute
requires the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to conduct a study on the use of mandatory
arbitration agreements with consumers of financial services or products, Section 1028 (a) and,
with language that is similar to that in Section 15(o) of the Exchange Act, vests the Bureau with
authority to "prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a
covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbi-
tration of any future dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or
imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consum-
ers." 12 U.S.C. § 5518 (b).
125 Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (Jan. 10, 2012).
126 Id. at 672.
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Given that Dodd-Frank has also vested the SEC with the same au-
thority using nearly identical language, Section 15(o) should also
provide sufficient "clarity" of congressional intent.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF FORECLOSING SECURITIES CLASS
ACTIONS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The highly regulated structure of the securities industry, with
the primary goals of promoting market efficiency and investor pro-
tection, provide compelling arguments, consistent with the FAA
and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, that FINRA can prohibit
members from inserting judicial class action waivers in customer
agreements. Given the Supreme Court's increasing hostility to ju-
dicial class actions, 27 however, many investors with small securities
claims may find themselves in the same position that individuals
with small consumer, antitrust and employment claims now find
themselves as a result of Concepcion12 1 and Italian Colors:129 una-
ble to effectively pursue their claims in arbitration because the
costs of doing so significantly exceed the value of those claims.13 0
127 In addition to decisions such as AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011), and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013), the Supreme Court
has issued decisions in the last couple of decades that have significantly raised the bar on private
plaintiffs bringing claims under the federal securities laws. See Carl W. Hittinger & Jarod M.
Bona, The Diminishing Role of the Private Attorney General in Antitrust and Securities Class
Action Cases Aided by the Supreme Court, 4 J. Bus. & TECH. LAw 167, 175 (2009) (The Court
has "limited class actions either outright or by providing lower courts with tools to dismiss the
actions that are not likely meritorious."); Daniel J. Morrissey, After the Ball is Over: Investor
Remedies in the Wake of the Dot-Com Crash and Recent Corporate Scandals, 83 NEB. L. REV.
732, 739-42 (2005) (tracing history of Supreme Court and lower federal courts' decisions impos-
ing restrictions on private securities litigation and class actions).
128 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
129 Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. 2304
130 As the dissent in Concepcion recognized, "agreements that forbid the consolidation of
claims can lead small-dollar claimants to abandon their claims rather than to litigate." Concep-
cion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). See also Gross, supra note 65,
at 49 ("By inserting a class action waiver clause in their consumer contracts, companies can
prevent consumers from aggregating small claims, forcing them to pursue small claims individu-
ally. . . .") (internal citations omitted); Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The
Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court's Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 Hous. L.
REv. 457, 462-63 (2011) ("[T]he most pressing issue in consumer arbitration, in the wake of
recent Supreme Court decisions, is the lack of a viable forum for consumers with low value
claims."); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90
OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012) ("It is highly ironic but no less distressing that a case with a name
'conception' should come to signify death for the legal claims of many potential plaintiffs.") (em-
phasis added).
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While Concepcion badly wounded the "effective vindication"
doctrine, Italian Colors may have fired the fatal shot. The "effec-
tive vindication" doctrine was derived from language in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler,13 ' where the Supreme Court, in compelling
arbitration of antitrust and unfair competition claims, stated that
"so long as the prospective litigant may vindicate its statutory
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute [providing the
cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and deter-
rent function. "132 The Court later suggested in Green Tree Fin.
Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph,3 s that a district court may bar enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement if the claimant can establish that
excessive arbitration fees and costs would effectively bar claimant
from "vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral fo-
rum."13 4  Randolph supported the notion that if litigants can
demonstrate that the costs of pursuing their federal claims in arbi-
tration would be prohibitively expensive, and thereby prevent
them from effectively vindicating their statutory rights, a district
court could refuse to enforce a PDAA.13 5
Although few federal lower courts have used this doctrine to
bar enforcement of a PDAA,13 6 and none have done so in the se-
curities arbitration context,3 7 it would appear that the Supreme
Court's recent Italian Colors decision effectively shuts the door to
the "effective vindication" doctrine. In reversing the Second Cir-
131 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chyrsler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
132 Id. at 637.
133 531 U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000).
134 Id. at 90. Randolph, a mobile home purchaser, brought a class action against the lender
that financed purchase alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act and Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act. Id. at 82-83. The Eleventh Circuit had reversed the district court's order compelling
arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration provision in the parties' lending agreement was
silent as to arbitration fees and costs and, therefore, was unenforceable because it "posed a risk
that [Randolph's] ability to vindicate her statutory rights would be undone by 'steep' arbitration
costs." Id. at 84. The Court reversed, observing that the record contained no information as to
the costs of arbitration and, thus, the "risk" that Randolph would be saddled with prohibitive
costs was just too speculative to justify not enforcing the arbitration agreement. Id. at 90-91.
135 See generally Miriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 623, 641 (2012) ("Randolph harmo-
nizes the FAA with substantive federal remedial statutes by mandating that 'that party bear[]
the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs'-that is, that it would incur costs so
steep as to preclude vindication of the federal right.").
136 Gross, supra note 4, at 496. See also Black & Gross, supra note 7, at 46.
137 Id. at n.108 (citations omitted); see also Black, supra note 10, at 6-7 (although the Su-
preme Court has acknowledged that excessive arbitration fees may deny litigants access to an
arbitration forum, this argument has not been effective in the context of securities arbitration,
particularly where SROs have waived or deferred payment of forum filing fees on the basis of
the claimant's financial condition).
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cuit's decision refusing to enforce a PDAA in the context of a class
action alleging antitrust violations against American Express,13 8
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, dismissed the doctrine as
mere dicta and rejected the notion that the costs of pursuing indi-
vidualized claims in arbitration could operate to invalidate a
PDAA. 1 3 9 Reasoning that the doctrine originated from a desire to
protect the prospective assertion of rights,14 0 the Court made clear
that the doctrine does not invalidate a mandatory PDAA due to
costs associated with proving the claim.1 4 1. "[T]he fact that it is not
worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy."14 2
Italian Colors all but extinguishes any potential exception to
judicial class action waivers in arbitration agreements.143  In the
context of securities arbitration, it would be difficult to imagine
"administrative fees" that could meet the standard set by the Court
in Italian Colors except in the smallest of cases. 4 4 Thus, as FINRA
v. Schwab slowly makes its way through the NAC and, if reversed,
the SEC and federal court, it is imperative that the SEC, FINRA,
financial firms and other stakeholders in the securities industry be-
138 In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig. 667 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2012) (Amex III).
139 Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013).
140 According to the majority, examples of such barriers to the potential assertion of statutory
rights include an arbitration provision forbidding the assertion of certain rights of action in the
first place, or an arbitral system that imposes "administrative fees" that are "so high as to make
access to the forum impracticable." Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reluctantly acknowledged that Italian Colors
"invalidated" the public policy that the court had relied upon only two months prior to invali-
date a PDAA in a Dell service contract with its customers on the grounds that the low value of
any recovery would make it unlikely that any claims would be pursued outside of the context of
a class judicial proceeding. Feeney v. Dell Inc., 454 Mass. 192, SJC-11133 (Ma. Aug. 1, 2013)
(Feeney III). See also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP., 2013 WL 4033844 at *5 (2d Cir. Aug.
9, 2013) (in class action, Second Circuit held that Italian Colors compelled the conclusion that
class action waiver in employment contract "is not rendered invalid by virtue of the fact that
[plaintiffs claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act] is not economically worth pursuing
individually").
144 Although FINRA arbitration can become expensive, particularly protracted, complex or
larger cases that are heavily litigated, FINRA initial filing fees are not overly burdensome as
they are based on a sliding scale (from $50 for claims under $1,000 to $1,800 for claims over
$1,000,000), FINRA Rule 12900, and FINRA routinely defers or waives payment of fees if the
claimant alleges a financial hardship. Fee Waivers, FINRA available at http://www.finra.org/Ar-
bitrationAndMediation/Arbitration/Fees/FeeWaivers/index.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
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gin to consider creative solutions for handling small investor
claims. 14 5
As an initial matter, the possibility that FINRA's prohibition
on class action waivers may fall victim to the Supreme Court's in-
creasingly expansive interpretation of the FAA has renewed calls
for the SEC to exercise its authority under Section 15(o) of the
Exchange Act and prohibit mandatory PDAAs.14 6  One of the
likely reasons the SEC has not limited or prohibited the use of
PDAAs is because Section 15(o) contains a significant limitation-
the SEC can only prohibit mandatory arbitration with respect to
disputes arising under the federal securities laws, rules and regula-
tions thereunder, and SRO rules.1 47 A vast majority of customer
claims allege violations of state law,14 8 which would be subject to
mandatory arbitration. Thus even if the SEC exercised its author-
ity and prohibited PDAAs, firms would still be able to require arbi-
tration of state law claims, effectively thrusting the industry back to
the pre-McMahon bifurcation of federal and state claims.14 9
145 Eliminating judicial class actions as a vehicle for resolution of small investor claims is a
significant denial of substantive rights and remedies in an industry where customers have no real
choice given the universal use of PDAAs in customer agreements. Constantine N. Katsoris, The
Trojan Horse Revisited, 4 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 3 (2013).
146 See generally Comments Submitted, Pre-Dispute Arbitration, Title IX Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Wells Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, available at http://www.sec.gov/
comments/df-title-ix/pre-dispute-arbitration/pre-dispute-arbitration.shtml. The North American
Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") sent a letter to the SEC on the heels of the
Schwab OHO Decision, urging the SEC to exercise its authority under Dodd-Frank to ban
mandatory arbitration provisions in light of FINRA v. Schwab. Letter from A. Heath Absure,
NASAA President, to SEC Chairman Mary Jo White, SEC (May 3, 2013), available at http://
www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-ix/pre-dispute-arbitration/predisputearbitration-21.pdf. Al-
though NASAA expressed its preference for an outright ban, its appeal focused on the need to
ensure the availability of the judicial class action as an avenue for the redress of small investor
claims. Id.
147 15 U.S.C. § 780(o).
148 FINRA reported 4,299 new arbitration cases filed in 2012, many of which alleged causes of
action arising under state law, including negligence (45%), breach of fiduciary duty (51%), and
breach of contract (37%). FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics, FRINA, available at http://www.
finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014); see also Gross, supra note 4, at 519 ("[M]ost customer arbitrations
today are predicated on state securities acts and common law claims such as breach of fiduciary
duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud, and draw heavily on principles of equity.").
149 Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1985) (holding that in cases
involving both non-arbitrable federal claims and state law claims that were subject to arbitration,
FAA requires arbitration of arbitrable claims even if it would result in bifurcated proceedings
and "'piecemeal' litigation"). See also Black, supra note 3, at 118-19; Black & Gross, supra note
7, at 23.
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In the highly unlikely event that Congress passes the AFA,1so
bifurcation would no longer be an issue, but other problems per-
sist. As Professor Black notes, if the AFA is passed and FINRA
Rule 12200 (which requires brokers to arbitrate at the request of
the customer) remains in effect, the industry will cry "foul" since
the choice of arbitration is left solely to the customer.1 5 ' Moreo-
ver, FINRA will effectively become a "small claims" forum be-
cause customers with large claims will go to court, while smaller
claims (that are not subject to a judicial class action) will remain in
FINRA, inevitably leading the industry to give up its strong sup-
port for FINRA arbitration.15 2 If FINRA abrogates Rule 12200 to
level the arbitration playing field, most or all investor claims will
end up in the already overcrowded and costly court system' 5 3 -a
result that is not beneficial for most investors, especially those with
smaller claims,154
Given the progress in the past two decades to improve securi-
ties arbitration procedures for customer claims, it would seem that
the better course would be to build upon the existing system to
better accommodate small claims. FINRA currently provides a
150 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, S. 987, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/
113/s878, and H.R. 1844, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congressbills/113/hrl844. The pro-
posed legislation would amend the FAA by adding a new chapter invalidating PDAAs in con-
sumer, investor, employment or civil rights claims. Friedman, supra note 4, at 1. "The AFA
would effectively eliminate adhesion arbitration by invalidating pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments in almost every setting in which an individual is required to arbitrate disputes with an-
other contracting party possessing greater bargaining power as a condition of doing business
with that party." Aronovsky, supra note 105, at 177.
151 Black, supra note 3, at 121. The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA), in fact took this position when the AFA was proposed in 2007, arguing in a white
paper it published on securities arbitration that "[o]pponents of predispute arbitration agree-
ments ... seek neither fairness nor equality; rather, they seek an unfair strategic advantage. They
want investors to retain their right to arbitrate as they see fit, but to deprive investment firms of
the same right." White Paper on Arbitration in the Securities Industry, SIFMA-SIFMACL 3 (Oct.
2007), available at https://www.sifma.org/issues/item.aspx?id=21334.
152 Black, supra note 3, at 120.
153 Friedman, supra note 4, at 3; see also Aronovsky, supra note 105, at 178-79 ("[T]he AFA
raises significant access to justice concerns by potentially foreclosing the availability of a faster,
less expensive, and more informal dispute resolution process than court litigation for employees
and consumers.").
154 Many investors fare better in arbitration than in court, because, among other things, the
arbitral forum is speedy, inexpensive, and arbitrators are not necessarily bound to follow the
letter of the law but, rather, strive to achieve an equitable result. Gross, supra note 4, at 519. In
2012, customers were awarded damages 45% of the time. FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics,
FINRA, available at http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/
AdditionalResources/Statistics/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
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simplified arbitration procedure for claims under $50,000,155 which
provides for disposition of a claim solely on the parties' written
submissions. These "paper cases" are less costly because they are
decided by one public arbitrator without a hearing."' FINRA's
simplified arbitration procedure, however, still presents some sig-
nificant challenges for the resolution of customer disputes.
First, the simplified arbitration process is complicated for
many because it requires drafting and submission of a "statement
of claim" that sets forth "the relevant facts" and remedies re-
quested, and attaching any relevant documents to the customer's
claim.1 57 The process requires the selection of a public arbitrator
by striking and ranking among a list of ten public arbitrators gener-
ated by FINRA (requiring research and a return of the parties'
ranking forms within twenty days), 58 and could involve limited dis-
covery.1 5 9 This process is difficult for many to navigate without le-
gal representation, which, in turn, is difficult to obtain for claims
under $50,000. Without access to a law school securities arbitration
clinic1 6 0 or other pro bono representation, small claim investors are
left with the choice of abandoning their claim altogether, or pro-
ceeding pro se in a system that, despite its title, is not easy to use.16 1
155 FINRA Rule 12800,(Simplified Arbitration), available at http://finra.complinet.comlen/dis-
play/display-main.html?rbid=2403&elementid=4185.
156 Id.
157 FINRA Rule 12302 (Filing an Initial Statement of Claim) and 12800 (Simplified Arbitra-
tion); see also Barbara Black, supra note 10, at 13.
158 FINRA Rule 12402.
159 FINRA Rule 12800.
160 In 1997 Pace Law School developed one of the first law school securities arbitration clin-
ics, after then-SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt contacted Professor Barbara Black and asked if the
law school would consider opening a clinic to assist investors whose claims were too small for
them to obtain legal representation. Barbara Black, Establishing a Securities Arbitration Clinic:
The Experience at Pace, 50 J. LEGAL EDuc. 34, 37 (2000). Chairman Levitt had heard numerous
complaints at town hall meetings he conducted throughout the couritry about the difficultly of
small claim investors to find adequate and affordable legal representation in arbitration. Id.; see
also Constatine L. Katsoris, Securities Arbitration: A Clinical Experiment, 25 FORDHAM URBAN
L. J. 193, 202 (1997-1998). Other law schools opened similar clinics, many with grants or pro-
ceeds from settlements issued to the law schools from the FINRA Foundation, the New York
Attorney General, and the Pennsylvania Securities Commission. Guidelines for Establishing a
Law School Investor Advocacy Clinic, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW & FINRA
FOUNDATION 29 (2009), available at http://www.finrafoundation.org/web/groups/foundation/
@foundation/documents/foundation/pll8734.pdf.
161 A 1997 study conducted by the Securities Arbitration Commentator ("SAC Study")
showed that approximately 75% of the customer cases in simplified arbitration proceedings (at
the time claims under $10,000) were pro se. See SAC Award Survey: How Fares the Pro Se
Investor In Arbitration? 8 SEc. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 1 (1997). The SAC Study also found
that represented investors fared far better than pro se investors, specifically, pro se investors who
had their cases decided on the papers prevailed 45.9% of the time versus 51% for represented
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Another important limitation of a "paper case" is that the
matter is decided without a hearing. Aside from the claimant's de-
sire to tell his or her story in a hearing, most customer disputes
involve issues of credibility that are difficult to resolve solely on the
papers.16 2 While Rule 12800 provides the claimant with the option
of requesting a hearing, the vast majority of claimants do not re-
quest a hearing,'1 63 likely because the costs of a full-blown hearing
would outweigh the amount of the claims at issue in the first place.
FINRA continues to implement new pilots designed to help
investors with small claims, such as its new "telephonic mediation"
program.164  Given perception of fairness problems presented by
solely "paper cases, "165 FINRA should consider a pilot program
for "telephonic hearings" to provide small claims customers an op-
tion to speak to someone about their case and present their facts
over the phone. 6 6 With the specter of a wave of new small inves-
tor claims flooding into arbitration should Schwab-type provisions
be ultimately permitted, however, far bolder alternatives should be
explored.
One alternative proposed by several scholars is that FINRA
develop a "small claims arbitrator," where a professionally trained
investors; pro se investors who requested a live hearing prevailed 41.7% of the time, while repre-
sented parties prevailed 55.4% of the time; and finally, pro se investors recovered 70.2% of what
they sought while represented parties recovered 77%. Id. at 2.
Five years earlier, in 1992, a similar study was conducted by the United States General
Accounting Office ("GAO"). GAO Study: How Arbitration Fares, 5 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR
1, 1 (1992) ("GAO Study"). The GAO Study found that investors represented by counsel settled
roughly 1.7 times more than pro se claimants and that represented investors' recovery rates were
1.6 times more likely to exceed the average recovery rate when they did prevail. Id.
162 Id. See also Gross, supra note 65, at 49 ("'[W]here credibility and veracity are at issue ...
written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision."') (citation and quotation
omitted).
163 Customers requested a hearing approximately 15% of the time in cases under $25,000
from 2002-2008. Gross, supra note 65, at 72.
164 See FINRA News Release, FINRA Launches Small Claims Telephonic Mediation Pilot
Program, FINRA (Jan. 16, 2013), available at http://www.finra.org/newsroom/newsreleases/2013/
p197693. FINRA launched a pilot program for simplified cases, i.e., cases under $50,000, provid-
ing for pro bono and reduced-fee telephonic mediation. Mediators in the pilot program agreed
to provide pro bono services for cases under $25,000, and a $50 per hour reduced fee services on
cases between $25,000 and $50,000. Under the new pilot program, which is entirely voluntary,
FINRA would not charge any administrative fees in connection with the mediation.
165 At least one empirical study has shown that customers have a decreased perception of
fairness in arbitrations conducted without a hearing. Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Per-
ception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors' Views of the Fairness of Securities
Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. RESOL. 349, 354 (2008).
166 Gross, supra note 65, at 81-82. "Because an arbitrator could listen to a witness tell a story
and testify orally, telephonic hearings would presumably enhance fairness perceptions regarding
the arbitration process for claimants and respondents alike." Id. at 82.
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arbitrator can hold a short hearing limited to the customer and a
brokerage representative telling their side of the story and the arbi-
trator issuing a prompt ruling. 16 7 Professor Black proposes that the
customer be allowed to appear pro se or with an attorney, but that
the brokerage firm be limited to a representative that is not an
attorney. 1 6 8  Since presumably the vast majority of such "small
claims" cases would be handled by the customer pro se, excluding
an attorney for the firm may alleviate fairness concerns for the in-
vestor. Firms may well object, however, to participating in a proce-
dure where they would be bound to an arbitrator's ruling without
representation.1 6 9
Given the fact that many claims are too small even to justify
the costs of simplified arbitration or a "small claims" process, how-
ever, some scholars have argued that it is time re-think class arbi-
tration.170  Although the majority in Concepcion demonstrated a
hostility towards class arbitration, stating that it would "interfere[ ]
with the fundamental attributes of arbitration" and defeat the pur-
poses of the FAA,"' in Oxford Healthl72 the Court unanimously
held that if the parties to an arbitration agreement consent to class
procedures, the FAA required enforcement of that agreement.
Moreover, the limitations of class arbitration raised by the
Court in Concepcion are based upon trying to accommodate a
"class" action within the confines of procedures designed for indi-
vidual cases. This is especially true in the context of securities arbi-
167 Black, supra note 10, at 13-14; see also Gross, supra note 65, at 82.
168 Black, supra note 10, at 14.
169 A better approach may be to simply disallow attorney representation for either party, as
suggested Professor Gross, since the trained "small claims arbitrator" would presumably elicit
the facts from both sides through questioning. Gross, supra note 65, at 82.
170 Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claims
After the Supreme Court Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 45 Lov. L.A.
L. REV. 435, 463-64 (2012); see also Bondi, supra note 53, at 635-36 (Bondi explores the use of
class arbitrations in a larger setting, i.e., including class actions against issuers, and argues that a
system could be developed-using FINRA as a model-to provide for some judicial oversight
(requiring judicial review through the motion to dismiss stage, and post-award judicial review)
and greater arbitrator flexibility to allow discovery).
171 AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748, 1755 (2011). Among other
things, the Court expressed concerns about the procedural informalities of arbitration and how
structurally it was ill-suited to implement the class procedures used in judicial class actions, the
expertise among arbitrators to rule on class certification issues, and the ability to bind absent
class members under such informal procedures. Id. at 1750. The Court also observed that class
arbitration would "greatly increase" risks to defendants due to the lack of multilayered review
which is available in judicial proceedings. Id. at 1752. "Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher
stakes of class litigation." Id.
172 Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070-71 (June 10, 2013).
173 Id.
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trations, since SROs have barred representative actions for over
two decades. Whether (and how) FINRA arbitration could imple-
ment a procedure for representative arbitrations is beyond the
scope of this article, but it would seem that many of the concerns
raised about class arbitrations could be addressed by developing a
separate track for class arbitrations with broader procedures de-
signed to provide for, among other things, notice and opt out pro-
cedures, greater pre-hearing discovery, specially trained arbitrators
and greater judicial review.1.7 4
VI. CONCLUSION
During the twenty-five years since McMahon pushed the vast
majority of customer disputes into arbitration, there have been sig-
nificant reforms-under the guidance of the SEC-designed to
make FINRA arbitration more efficient and transparent, less
costly, easier to understand and fairer to investors. As the SEC
and SROs recognized in 1992,7 however, investors should have
the ability to seek redress of small claims in judicial class actions.
Indeed, the class actions against Schwab regarding its Yield Plus
funds-which likely prompted Schwab to insert a class action
waiver in its customer agreements in 2011-perfectly illustrate why
judicial class actions are a critical tool in addressing investor claims
shared by a large group of investors: the average investor claim
was $881.76 It would simply not be economically feasible to pur-
sue these claims even under FINRA's simplified arbitration pro-
cess. FINRA v. Schwab threatens to foreclose this critical tool for
the resolution of securities claims.
There are reasons to be optimistic that FINRA's prohibition
against judicial class action waivers will ultimately be upheld. The
multilayered and self-regulatory structure under which the securi-
ties industry operates provides compelling arguments supporting
FINRA's ability to regulate PDAAs in broker-customer agree-
ments. Recent amendments to the Exchange Act, moreover, pro-
174 See, e.g., Bondi, supra note 53, at 635-36. But see Marti H. Malin, The Arbitration Fair-
ness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 313-14
(2012) (procedural due process issues raised by class actions are heightened in the context of
arbitrations; argues that the FAA should be amended to preclude class actions in arbitration).
175 SEC Order Relating to the Exclusion of Class Actions from Arbitration Proceedings,
supra note 53.
176 See supra note 67.
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vide "clear congressional intent" to vest the SEC with authority to
regulate the terms and use of PDAAs in the securities industry.
Given Concepcion and Italian Colors, however, there is a very
real risk that FINRA's prohibition against class action waivers will
also fall victim to the Supreme Court's increasingly broad interpre-
tation of the FAA.'7 7 In that case there will undoubtedly be enor-
mous pressure on the SEC to act under its authority and ban
mandatory PDAAs. Instead, the SEC should consider a more lim-
ited option, specifically, using its authority to prohibit waivers of
judicial class actions in PDAAs. This will serve to preserve both a
judicial forum for small claims that cannot be brought on an indi-
vidual basis in a cost-effective manner, as well as an alternative
dispute resolution forum that provides an efficient, cost-effective
and generally fair process for resolution of investor disputes.1 7 8 In
the meantime, FINRA should begin to consider new pilot pro-
grams for small claims, regardless of where FINRA v. Schwab may
lead.
177 In fact, if the NAC does not reverse the Schwab OHO Decision, the decision will stand
because section 19(h)(d)(2) only provides for appeal by member or associated person that is
subject to a disciplinary order. 15 U.S.C. §78s(d)(2).
178 As Professor Katsoris warns, "the public will not accept being forced into an arbitration
system where its rights and remedies are unilaterally stripped or limited by non-negotiated form
or otherwise adhesive agreements. Simply put, SRO arbitration cannot-under the guise of
speed and economy-be used as a Trojan Horse to cherry-pick away the claimant's rights." Kat-
soris, supra note 145, at 3.
